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ABSTRACT 
Data was obtained from 6,114 United States Marine Corps (USMC) Officers who 
graduated from The Basic School (TBS). The USMC data was used to conduct regression 
analysis on how Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) allocation affects retention. 
The regression model that was developed was a linear probability model. The results 
from the regression showed that retention was positively affected by receiving your first 
MOS preference and negatively affected by receiving an MOS outside your top three 
preferences. The USMC MOS allocation process is very similar to the Australian Army’s 
corps allocation process and the voluntary nature of military service in both countries 
enables comparisons to be drawn. Within the Australian Army, both the strength and the 
direction of the variable affects would be similar to those in the USMC. 
Optimization models were developed that maximized cadet preferences whilst 
also meeting service requirements. Data from cadets who graduated from the Royal 
Military College in 2008 and 2009 was utilized to assess four different optimization 
models. The models that were developed showed significant increases in those cadets 
who received their first or second preference and significant decreases in cadets being 
allocated to the third, fourth or other preferences. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this research is to determine whether Corps allocation is a 
significant factor affecting the retention of Australian Army officers. Ascertaining 
whether there is any correlation between Corps allocation and retention required 
capturing a large amount of data. Unfortunately, this data was not available for Australian 
officers, so the United States Marine Corps Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) 
process was analyzed. The Marine Corps MOS allocation process is similar to the 
Australian Army’s corps allocation process, which allows comparisons to be drawn. 
The Marine Corps data was refined to allow for regression analysis to be 
conducted. The regression model that was developed was a simple linear probability 
model (a multiple linear regression model with a binary dependant variable). The results 
from the regression showed that remaining in the military beyond your minimum service 
obligation was positively affected by receiving your first MOS preference, having prior 
service, being a male, being married and having a master’s degree. Remaining in the 
military beyond the minimum service obligation was negatively affected by the following 
factors: receiving an MOS outside your top three preferences, being Hispanic, and having 
a higher number of dependents. 
As corps allocation affects officer retention, it is essential to optimize the 
preferences of each cadet during the allocation process. Models were developed that 
maximized cadet preference, subject to meeting service requirements. Data from cadets 
who graduated from the Royal Military College in 2008 and 2009 was utilized to develop 
more robust and effective allocation models. The models that were developed showed 
significant retention increases in those cadets who received first or second preference and 
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Toward the end of training at the Royal Military College (RMC), all cadets are 
allocated to a specific corps.1 The vast majority of cadets will serve their entire military 
career within this corps. The allocation of cadets is a crucial element that shapes and 
defines the careers of Australian Army Officers.  
From the time of enlistment to graduation from RMC, cadets spend between 18 
and 48 months in training.2 This significant investment in training is designed to prepare 
cadets for careers in the Army by promoting leadership and integrity. It also inculcates a 
sense of duty, loyalty, and service to the nation. Prior to graduating from RMC, each 
cadet selects four corps they would like join. RMC staff then attempt to match up the 
positions that are available with the cadets’ preferences. The hypothesis of this paper is 
that cadets who receive lower order preferences have a significantly different retention 
profile than those cadets who receive their first or second preferences.   
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to determine whether corps allocation is a 
significant factor affecting the retention of Australian Army officers. This thesis will 
address the following primary question: 
1. Does a cadet’s allocation to either their first, second, third, or fourth corps 
preference affect their propensity to discharge? 
This thesis will also address the following secondary question: 
2. What are the alternatives to the current corps allocation process in the 
Australian Army? 
                                                 
1 A separate branch or department of the Army that has a specialized function. 
2 Australian Defence Force Academy cadets will have trained for at least 48 months and Royal 
Military College direct entry cadets will have trained for at least 18 months. 
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C. CONTEXT 
The military is like any organization, in that employee retention and employee 
turnover are critical elements of manpower planning. Officer retention is particularly 
important, because of the monetary investment in the training and education given to 
junior officers. The very nature of the Australian Army recruiting system reinforces the 
importance of officer retention as there is virtually no lateral entry. According to Jaquette 
and Nelson (1974), this type of recruiting system is defined as a closed system. To ensure 
sufficient numbers of senior officers, the Army must ensure it recruits, promotes, retains, 
and discharges an appropriate number of personnel.  
The defining moment in the career of a young cadet is when they receive their 
corps allocation. Many of the men and women who voluntarily chose to enter the military 
have a specific corps within which they desire to serve, and not being allocated to this 
corps can be a shattering experience. Failing to secure a high preference could have a 
lasting impact upon their future military career.     
D. DATA 
The Australian Army does not maintain suitable data on officer retention that can 
be matched to corps preference and Corps allocation. The United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) does maintain this data; this thesis will analyze this data to assess the presence 
of a relationship between corps allocation and retention, as such. The USMC training 
dynamic and corps allocation process are extremely similar to those of the Australian 
Army. It is possible to relate the conclusions that are drawn about the USMC to the 
Australian Army, because of the similarities between the two countries and their armed 
forces.   
Like the Australian military, the United States military is drawn entirely from 
volunteers. Both militaries also invest heavily in officer training and have compulsory 
minimum periods of service that follow commissioning. Australia and the United States 
also share the same language, similar political systems, and comparable cultural beliefs.  
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If USMC retention is affected by whether or not individuals receive their first, second, 
third, or fourth preference, then one can assume parallel results for Australian Army 
officers. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This research will analyze the relationship between officer corps allocation and 
propensity to discharge. It will also evaluate the Australian Army officer corps allocation 
process and determine whether a more effective system is available to maximize officer 
preferences whilst still meeting service manning requirements.  
The first segment will be a literary review of the trends related to officer corps 
allocation. It will examine what methods other developed countries are using to assign 
junior officers to a trade.  
The second segment will analyze of the effects of corps allocation on an officer’s 
propensity to discharge. United States data will be utilized to ascertain whether cadets 
who obtain lower corps preferences are more or less likely to discharge.  
The third segment will review the current Australian corps allocation process. It 
will evaluate alternate methods for maximizing cadet preferences whilst also meeting 
service requirements. Data from cadets who graduated from RMC in 2008 and 2009 will 
be utilized to develop more robust and effective allocation models.   
The summary, conclusions, and recommendations will link the findings from the 
United States and Australian data, and will offer possible alternatives to the current 
process of corps allocation in the Australian Army. The end result is to show whether a 
more effective allocation process can help boost retention of Australian Army officers.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
Few topics within human resource management have captured as much attention 
as employee turnover. Since the mid 1900s, there has been an enormous amount of both 
qualitative and quantitative research done to ascertain why an organization either retains 
or loses its employees. It was more than 50 years ago that the groundbreaking research of 
March and Simon (1958) proposed that employees confront two fundamental decisions 
when dealing with employers. One is the decision of whether to produce and the other is 
the decision of whether to participate. The focus of this literature review will be on the 
latter: the factors that affect an individual’s decision to participate for an organization. 
The reason why March and Simon (1958) and numerous other researchers have done so 
much work on this topic is twofold. First, the factors that affect and define turnover rates 
are diverse and varied and, second, excessive turnover can have a catastrophic impact on 
an organization.  
The study of the mind and the mental processes that an individual undertakes, 
especially in relation to behavior, is termed “psychology.” Psychology seeks to 
understand and explain phenomena such as perception, attention, emotion, behavior, 
personality, and motivation. There are numerous factors that affect an individual’s 
psychology, and there also numerous fields of psychology. Some of the more prominent 
fields of psychology include: child psychology, cognitive psychology, and social 
psychology. This research deals predominantly with aspects within either the cognitive or 
social psychology areas. Cognitive psychology deals with how the human mind receives 
and interprets impressions and ideas. Social psychology looks at how the actions of 
others influence the behavior of an individual. This literature review will draw upon 
many different authors in an attempt to compile a list of the key factors that influence the 
psychology of an individual’s retention decisions.  
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All organizations rely upon a certain number of employees entering and leaving to 
increase effectiveness. The inflow of new personnel brings with it new ideas and new 
philosophies. However, the challenge for manpower planners is to ensure this employee 
turnover is optimized as the costs of high turnover are significant. In relation to military 
officers, the financial cost of recruiting and training suitable replacements is extremely 
high. In a closed system, such as the military, any officer that discharges has to be 
replaced by another from within the organization. The military must retain enough 
officers at the junior and mid-level ranks for the organization to function effectively. In 
the context of this study, retention will be defined as an officer’s voluntary decision to 
remain on active service, beyond their initial return of service obligation. The higher the 
retention levels, the more the military is able to recoup its training investment. It is 
therefore paramount that the military is acutely aware of the factors that affect the 
retention dynamics of its officers. This chapter will examine the major findings of both 
civilian and military research into employee turnover.  
Researchers studying employee turnover have utilized approaches that have been 
largely defined by the disciplinary matrix or methodology they have adopted. These 
studies can be divided into two broad groups. The first group attempts to provide general 
models and the second studies specific variables. March and Simon (1958) were among 
the first to attempt to combine both methodologies into one model. They built a 
generalized model of turnover, but incorporated dependant criteria within the model. 
These criteria are grouped as: 
a. personal characteristics: age, sex, marital status, and length of service. 
b. organizational characteristics: size of work group, visibility of 
organization, reputation of the organization, and the number of extra-
organizational alternatives.   
c. job-related characteristics: rewards, supervision, job satisfaction, pay, and 
promotion prospects.  
March and Simon (1958) argued that the inter-relationship among these variables will 
determine the turnover phenomenon. 
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After March and Simon (1958) there was a period from 1960 through the early 
1970s when economists dominated the debate about workforce turnover. The patterns of 
employee retention were linked exclusively to pay and labor market factors. It was not 
until the mid 1970s that psychologists such as Mobley (1977) once again placed the 
spotlight on job satisfaction, promotion prospects, and work environment. There was 
further refinement in 1979 by Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, and Meglino in their article 
entitled, “Review and Conceptual Analysis of the Employee Turnover Process.” Their 
article was successful in truly applying a multivariate approach to worker turnover. 
Instead of adopting a singular focus, the authors endeavored to capture all of the 
significant elements that can impact an individual’s decision to either stay or leave. 
The dynamic between employer and employee has changed significantly over the 
past two decades. As Sims (1994) points out, there is no longer the cradle-to-grave 
relationship that once dominated the employment landscape. Previously, employers were 
expected to look out for and protect employee’s interests and, in turn, employees were 
expected to protect employer interests. There was a clear expectation that the employee / 
employer relationship would be a long-term, stable, and predictable relationship where a 
set amount of work would yield a specific level of rewards. This dynamic was especially 
strong in the military, where there were very attractive pension packages available for 
personnel who served for greater than 20 years. Rousseau and Geller (1994) state that the 
new psychological contract between employer and employee is characterized by fluidity 
and brevity. Employees are now far more likely to move from one job to the next and 
from one career to the next. The challenge for employers is to create a sense of belonging 
and commitment to the organization that will bond the employee to the company.  
Like March and Simon (1958), the majority of academics believe that the factors 
that shape retention patterns can be grouped into two categories. These two categories are 
work-related factors and individual characteristics.  
B. WORK-RELATED FACTORS 
Numerous studies have analyzed the internal and external work related factors 
that correlate with individuals either leaving or remaining with an organization. These 
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studies have found that factors, such as job satisfaction, economic conditions, and pay 
have an important impact on employee turnover.  
Job satisfaction is the extent to which individuals derive pleasure or enjoyment 
from their jobs. Job satisfaction is among the most popular and widely debated topics in 
the area of organizational behavior and human resource management. The reasons for this 
interest are quite varied and include the idea that understanding the potential sources of 
job satisfaction will help develop organizational models that maximize employee 
motivation, performance, and retention. A higher level of employee satisfaction relates to 
a lower level of employee turnover. Authors such Porter and Steers (1973), Pearson 
(1995) and Mowbay (1977) have proven that the link between job satisfaction and 
employee turnover is significant and consistent, and it is generally quite strong.  
A factor that parallels turnover rates is the condition of the economy: in particular, 
the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate is important because there is strong 
evidence to indicate that people link the unemployment rate with perceived job 
opportunities. An individual’s probability of finding alternate work has been shown by 
Mobley, Horner, and Hollingsworth (1978) to have a significant and positive effect on 
turnover rates. A lower unemployment rate (high probability of finding alternate 
employment) leads to a higher turnover rate (more people who transfer between 
organizations).  
The level of pay or remuneration individuals receive also impacts whether they 
will remain with an organization or seek alternate employment. Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, 
and Meglino (1979) claimed that an individual’s pay satisfaction was significantly 
correlated to turnover rates. Cotton and Tuttle (1986) conducted a review of 32 turnover 
studies, and they found significant evidence to support the hypothesis of a negative 
relationship between pay and turnover rates. Within the studies that they examined, 29 of 
32 data sets found that higher pay led to lower employee turnover.  
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C. INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Numerous studies have focused on the individual or personal factors that shape 
workforce turnover. These variables include factors such as: age, gender, marital status, 
length of tenure, and educational status. Each of these individual factors has varying 
degrees of influence on whether a person chooses to leave an organization or stay 
employed with the organization.  
The degree to which an individual’s expectations are being met also correlates to 
employee turnover. Porter and Steers (1973) identified that employees who enter an 
organization with realistic expectations that the organization can meet are less likely to 
leave than those employees whose expectations are not being met. The reason for this is 
that employees whose expectations are being met are essentially being rewarded with the 
experience and job for which they signed up. The employee believes the employer is 
upholding their end of the unwritten contract into which the two parties entered. This 
concept is crucially important in the context of military officers, because many young 
men and women join the Army with very specific expectations for their careers. They 
may have family connections or other interests that have led them to want to join a 
particular Corps. Assigning these cadets to a Corps that is not their first choice means that 
their expectations are not being met. Muchinsky and Tuttle (1979) and, more recently, 
Pearson (1995) argue that failing to meet employees’ expectations will result in a far 
higher turnover rate.       
Age is an important factor when assessing whether an individual will stay with an 
organization. Older employees are less likely to resign than their younger colleagues 
because many may find it more difficult to secure alternate employment. Employers still 
discriminate both intentionally and unintentionally with their recruitment and selection 
practices. Porter and Steers (1973) identified a strong positive relationship between age 
and retention. This was further supported by a study conducted by Mobley, Griffeth, 
Hand, and Meglino (1979), who confirmed that an employee’s propensity to resign 
declined as they got older. Cotton and Tuttle (1986) found that a majority of the studies 
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that they examined supported the negative relationship between age and turnover; in 
other words the older employees are the less likely they are to resign.  
Educational status has consistently been linked to employee turnover. It is 
believed that individuals with more education are more likely to leave an organization. 
The rationale is that an individual with increased education has greater employment 
opportunities than a less-qualified counterpart. Cotton and Tuttle (1986) summarized that 
nearly all of the 32 studies they examined had a positive relationship between education 
and turnover.  
There are numerous studies that examine the relationship between employee 
turnover and marital status; the problem is that the findings are very mixed. Some 
authors, such as Arnold and Feldman (1982), have concluded that married employees are 
far less likely to transition between jobs than their unmarried counterparts. In direct 
contrast 6 of the 32 studies that were reviewed by Cotton and Tuttle (1986) showed that 
married individuals were more likely to turn over than those who were not married. There 
are some authors who believe the results are so varied because the married / unmarried 
variable is too broad. Porter and Steers (1973) propose that the single demographic 
variable of marital status be further refined into family size and composition.  
In their early studies of retention, Porter and Steers (1973) discovered that 
increased tenure had a positive impact upon an individual’s propensity to remain with a 
particular employer. This was further supported when Mobley, Griffeth, Hand and 
Meglino (1979) conducted a study that confirmed tenure was consistently and positively 
related to retention. The longer an individual works for an organization, the stronger is 
their bond and affinity with the organization, and therefore the less likely the individual is 
to transfer to another company.  
Varying measures of personality traits, coupled with interest inventories, have 
proven to be quite effective in predicting turnover rates within the civilian community. 
The key personality traits that authors such as Cotton and Tuttle (1986) generally believe 
correlates with employee turnover include: stress management / coping skills, desire for 
recognition, need for achievement, and locus of control. The vast majority of authors who 
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researched the link between personality traits and turnover rates concluded that these 
traits were very good predictors. The problem is that personality traits are very 
occupation specific: the relative significance of a particular personality trait can not be 
transferred across occupational groups.  
Studies linking measures of intelligence or aptitude with organizational turnover 
have been inconclusive. The findings have been split evenly: some studies have stated 
there is no relationship, while others have said there is a positive relationship, and yet 
others have concluded there is a negative relationship. Muchinsky and Tuttle (1979) 
analyzed numerous personality studies and concluded that no clear pattern or correlation 
was evident between intelligence / aptitude and employee turnover.   
A summary of the civilian literature effects and strengths for each variable is 
shown in Table 1. The table reflects the majority consensus assessment for each variable 
that was detailed in the civilian literature. 
Table 1.   Variable Effect and Variable Strength 
VARIABLE DIRECTION OF EFFECT STRENGTH OF EFFECT 
Job satisfaction Negative Strong 
Economic condition Negative Mild / Strong 
Pay Negative Mild / Strong 
Met expectations Negative Mild  
Age Negative Mild 
Education Positive Mild 
Marital status Mixed Weak 
Tenure Negative Mild 
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VARIABLE DIRECTION OF EFFECT STRENGTH OF EFFECT 
Personality traits Mixed Weak 
Intelligence Mixed Weak 
 
D. MILITARY SPECIFIC  
The dynamics of a career within the military are quite different from a job within 
the civilian environment. The nature of the work that military members perform, and the 
contracts under which they enlist, result in a unique turnover paradigm. The studies that 
have been conducted with a military focus have concentrated on many of the same factors 
as the civilian studies. For the most part, the results from military studies have been fairly 
similar to the results obtained from civilian studies. The difference between the two has 
been the significance and direction that the variables have on turnover rates. Some 
variables that have a positive effect in the civilian context are found to have a negative 
impact within the military. Conversely, some variables that have a negative effect in the 
civilian context are found to have a positive impact within the military. 
Wilcove, Burch, Conroy, and Bruce (1991) conducted an extremely 
comprehensive comparison of both military and civilian turnover research (Table 2). 
They concluded that while similar turnover variables have been examined in the military 
and the civilian community, there are differences in the extent to which the variables 
have been examined. The military tends to focus on the family dynamic issues such as 
separation lengths and deployment history. The civilian studies have focused on work 
and personal factors.  
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Table 2.   Summary of Military Turnover Variables (From Burch, Conroy, & Bruce, 1991) 
VARIABLE DIRECTION OF EFFECT STRENGTH OF EFFECT 
Age Negative Mild 
Marital Status Positive Mild 
Race Mixed Weak 
Education Negative Mild 
Personality Negative Weak 
Aptitude Mixed Weak 




The Wilcove, Burch, Conroy, and Bruce (1991) research concluded that job 
challenge / job satisfaction was strongly and consistently associated with turnover rates. 
The greater the challenge and reward that individuals receive from their work, the lower 
the organization turnover. The authors also noted that recent studies have placed an 
increasingly greater emphasis on job factors in comparison to early studies.  
The importance of job satisfaction as a turnover influence was further supported 
by Vernez and Zellman (1987), when they analyzed the 1979 United States Department 
of Defense Survey of Personnel. The study showed that job-related reasons were rated 
either the first or second most important factors affecting members who were considering 
discharging. The authors stated that these results applied to both officers and enlisted 
members. Vernez and Zellman (1987) were convinced that within the military there was a 
very profound link between job factors and discharge intentions.  This conclusion was 
later supported by Lakhani (1991) when he conducted a cost / benefit analysis of united 
States officer retention. 
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Measures of intelligence or aptitude have been studied quite extensively in the 
civilian community, but they have received very limited attention within the military 
environment. The studies that have been conducted on military personal have focused 
mainly on enlisted members. A study by Githens, Neumann, and Abrahams (1966) found 
no correlation between the length of service of United States Naval officers and their 
scores on the Naval College Aptitude test or the Officer Classification Battery scores.    
A unique variable within the military turnover dynamic is the issue of mental 
strength or mental toughness. Employment within the military is physically and mentally 
more demanding than most civilian jobs. According to authors such as Cigrang, Todd, 
Fielder, and Carbone (1999), psychological stamina needs to be considered when 
analyzing turnover rates. These authors stress the importance of mental health during the 
initial periods of training.  The transition from civilian to military culture can be 
accomplished only through intense training programs that place new recruits in 
demanding situations that exceed their previous mental and physical limits.      
A key concept in the analysis of military turnover is the Annualized Cost of 
Leaving Model (ACOL). Warner and Goldberg developed this model in 1984 to predict 
the effect of pay on separation rates. The model compares an individual’s cost of leaving 
the military to the expected utility or reward they will derive from civilian employment. 
The model has been used extensively by the Department of Defense to evaluate alternate 
compensation strategies and their effect on employee turnover rates.    
When the ACOL model was first developed, it was mainly used to assess enlisted 
personnel. Smoker (1984) refined the ACOL model to estimate the effects on both 
officers and enlisted personnel. The results that he obtained showed that the estimated 
ACOL coefficient is closely linked to the assumed discount rate. The next step in 
theoretical modeling was taken by Gotz and McCall (1984) when they developed the 
Dynamic Retention Model (DRM). The DRM extends the Warner and Goldberg (1984) 
model to officers’ career decisions. The DRM adds two additional elements to the ACOL 




officer may place on future career flexibility. The DRM can be used to explore different 
policy options by taking individual retention decisions and running them through various 
policy alternatives. 
E. LITERATURE SUMMARY 
The research literature clearly suggests that numerous factors help to predict 
employee turnover, both military and civilian. The factors most commonly cited in the 
literature include job satisfaction, pay, individual personal characteristics, promotion 
opportunities, unemployment rate, and met expectations. The most consistent relationship 
that emerged from both civilian and military research is that turnover is inversely 
associated with job autonomy and job satisfaction. The more individuals feel empowered 
and autonomous in their jobs, the higher their levels of job satisfaction and the higher 
their propensity to remain with the organization. The literature provides a very good 
indication of what variables should be included in a model that endeavors to quantify the 
factors correlated with employee turnover.  
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III. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES MARINE 
CORPS OFFICERS 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this chapter is to detail the United States Marine Corps (USMC) 
officer commissioning system and to ascertain whether there is any correlation between 
corps accession source allocation and retention. Firstly, the chapter will cover each of the 
seven different accession sources to highlight the significant investment involved in 
training USMC officers. Secondly, this chapter will develop regression models that 
quantify the positive or negative impacts that USMC allocation has on retention.    
B. COMMISSIONING PROGRAMS 
There are seven different avenues through which a USMC officer can enlist; each 
of these accession avenues is unique in terms of the potential candidate pool, the entry 
requirements, and the length of training. The seven different commissioning sources are 
as follows: 
1. The United States Naval Academy (USNA) 
Cadets who enter the USNA undertake a four-year training program that involves 
both academic and military training. They graduate as an officer in either the Navy or the 
USMC. To be eligible for consideration to attend the USNA, applicants must be United 
States citizens, unmarried, have no dependants, be medically fit, and be at least 17, but no 
older than 23, years of age. All USNA graduates are required to serve a minimum of five 
years of active service. 
2. Naval Reserve Officer Training Course (NROTC) 
The NROTC is the second officer accession program that the Marine Corps runs 
in conjunction with the Navy. The NROTC provides scholarship and non-scholarship 
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options at selected universities and colleges throughout the United States. In addition to 
their academic training, NROTC midshipmen also receive extensive military training. To 
be eligible for consideration, the NROTC applicants must be United States citizens, 
medically fit, at least 17, but no older than 23 years, of age, and have no criminal record. 
The minimum return of service obligation varies but is generally four years’ active 
service.  
3. Platoon Leaders Course (PLC) 
The PLC program is open to all college students who are attending accredited 
colleges and universities as full-time students. The program enables students to continue 
with their studies, whilst also attending the Officer Candidate School (OCS). The training 
at OCS consists of two six-week courses that are held during the summer holidays. The 
minimum return of service obligation varies but is generally three years’ active and five 
years’ reserve service.  
4. Officer Candidate Course (OCC) 
The OCC is a commissioning program that is open to college seniors or graduates. 
It provides prospective USMC officers with a glimpse of Marine Corps life with 
absolutely no commitment. Entry into the OCC begins with a ten-week course at OCS. If 
candidates pass this ten-week course, they can choose to receive a reserve commission 
and go to The Basic School (TBS) for additional training. The minimum return of service 
obligation is generally three years’ active service and five years’ reserve service. 
5. Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Program (MECEP) 
The MECEP is designed to provide enlisted active duty Marines with the 
opportunity to earn a college degree and become a USMC officer. Applicants must have 
a minimum of six years’ active service and have attained the rank of Corporal or above.  
If accepted into the program, the applicant attends a college with an NROTC unit on 
campus. The minimum return of service obligation is four years’ active service.  
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6. Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP) 
The ECP allows qualified Marines to apply for assignment to Officer Cadet 
School (OCS). To be eligible to apply for the program, Marines must have at least a 
bachelor’s degree and be between 21 and 30 years of age. Upon graduation from OCS, 
officers must serve a minimum of four years of active service and four years’ reserve 
service.  
7. Meritorious Commissioning Program (MCP) 
The MCP ensures that Marines who do not have a bachelor’s-level degree still 
have an avenue for commissioning as a USMC officer. This program gives Commanding 
Officers the ability to nominate highly qualified enlisted Marines who have displayed 
exceptional leadership. If accepted into the program, Marines attend the 10-week course 
at OCS. The minimum return of service obligation is four years of active service and four 
years’ reserve service. 
One common element of these seven different avenues is the minimum service 
obligation (MSO). The MSO defines how long a USMC officer is obligated to serve 
before becoming eligible to discharge. A summary of each commissioning source’s MSO 
is contained in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Summary of Active Service MSO 
Commissioning Source Active Service MSO 
1.    The United States Naval Academy (USNA) 5 years 
2.    Naval Reserve Officer Training Course (NROTC) 4 years  
3.    Platoon Leaders Course (PLC) 3 years 
4.    Officer Candidate Course (OCC) 3 years 
5.    Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Program (MECEP) 4 years 
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Commissioning Source Active Service MSO 
6.    Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP) 4 years 
7.    Meritorious Commissioning Program (MCP) 4 years 
 
C. COMMON MARINE CORPS OFFICER TRAINING 
After earning a commission via one of the seven accession sources, all USMC 
officers attend six months of training at TBS. During their six-month course at TBS, 
lieutenants receive training that is designed to give them the skills and knowledge they 
need to lead and inspire their troops. There is a heavy focus on preparing officers for an 
infantry platoon commander role. 
Upon graduation from TBS, each USMC officer is assigned a four-digit code 
denoting their occupational field and specialty. Each career field is one of the Military 
Occupational Specialties (MOS). Some examples of different MOSs are artillery, public 
affairs, infantry, training, and financial management. It is essential for young USMC 
officers to build their knowledge of each MOS, because they are required to select five 
MOS preferences. A key element of TBS course is the understanding and awareness that 
officers receive in relation to the range of MOS choices. 
The MOS assignment process is driven primarily by the needs of the USMC, with 
a secondary consideration for the individual Marine’s preference. Prior to 1977, MOS 
allocation was based solely on an individual's overall standing at TBS. All lieutenants 
were ranked according to their overall average in military skills, academics, and 
leadership. Those with the best overall score received their first preference. In 1977, the 
Commandant of the USMC made the decision to apply a quality spread to the MOS 
assignment process. The Commandant devised a policy that would ensure each MOS 
received an appropriate share of both the high-performing and low-performing 
lieutenants. This policy is still in effect today, with TBS stating that one-third of the 
quotas for each MOS come from the top, middle, and bottom thirds of the performance 
list. Within each third, class standing is the primary assignment criterion. Lieutenants 
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near the top of their one-third have the best opportunity to receive one of their top 
choices. Lieutenants near the bottom of their one-third increment have a lesser chance. 
D. DATA AND VARIABLES 
To ascertain whether there is any correlation between Corps allocation and 
retention required capturing a large amount of data. Unfortunately this data was not 
available from one central agency. To enable robust regression analysis, data was secured 
from two separate agencies and then merged into one data set. The two agencies that 
supplied data for this thesis were the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Total 
Force Data Warehouse (TFDW). 
1. Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 
The CNA is a non-profit institution that conducts high-level, in-depth research 
and analysis to inform and shape the work of public sector decision makers. The CNA is 
a federally funded research and development center serving the Department of the Navy 
and other defense agencies. The CNA is responsible for collecting and storing a vast 
amount of Department of Defense (DoD) data. Included in the data maintained by CNA 
is panel data for USMC officers. Each officer’s data file includes general demographic 
information, TBS academic performance, commissioning source, the top three MOS 
preferences, and the primary MOS.  
2. Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) 
The TFDW is the USMC knowledge management system that collects and 
maintains information on all USMC officers and enlisted members. TFDW data files 
were used to supplement the information that was obtained from CNA. Information that 
was drawn from the TFDW file and merged into the CNA file included length of service, 
commissioning sources, and pay levels (Blackman 2009). 
A data extract from CNA and TFDW were merged, which resulted in 37,080 data 
points. The data set contained information on USMC officers from 1980 to 2006. The 
first step in refining the data was to remove fiscal years 1980 to 1993 and 2000. They 
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were removed because no MOS preference information was maintained during these 
years. The next step was to remove fiscal years 2003 to 2006, because officers were still 
bound by a return of service obligation during this period. The end result was a final 
sample size including data for 6,114 USMC officers.  
E. REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
This research utilizes a computer program called Stata to run regressions on the 
USMC data. Stata is an integrated statistical package that enables data analysis and data 
management. The full range of data that was inputted into Stata included a wide range of 
demographic and service characteristics for each officer. A full list of each variable and 
its encoding within Stata is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Variable Description 
Category 
Variable 





    
 Retention to the 
6-year point 
Retained  Binary  1 = Retained  
0 = otherwise 
INDEPENDENT 
 
    
Demographics  Gender  Female  Binary  1 = Female  
0 = Male 
  Male  Binary  1 = Male  
0 = Female 
 Race/Ethnicity  White  Binary  1 = White  
0 = otherwise 
  Black  Binary  1 = Black  
0 = otherwise 
  Asian  Binary  1 = Asian  
0 = otherwise 
  Hispanic Binary  1 = Hispanic 
0 = otherwise 
 Marital Status  Married  Binary  1 = Married  
0 = otherwise 
  Single  Binary  1 = Single  
0 = otherwise 
  Divorced  Binary  1 = Divorced  




Description Variable  Variable 
Type 
Range 
 Number of 
Dependents 
Dependents  Continuous Add 1 for each 
dependent 
Service Info  Commissioning 
Source 
USNA  Binary  1 = USNA officer  
0 = otherwise 
  NROTC  Binary  1 = NROTC officer  
0 = otherwise 
  PLC  Binary  1 = PLC officer  
0 = otherwise 
  OCC  Binary  1 = OCC officer  
0 = otherwise 
  MECEP  Binary  1 = MECEP officer  
0 = otherwise 
  ECP  Binary  1 = ECP officer  
0 = otherwise 
  MCP  Binary  1 = MCP officer  
0 = otherwise 
 TBS Third  Top  Binary  1 = Top third  
0 = otherwise 
  Middle  Binary  1 = Middle third   
0 = otherwise 
  Lower  Binary  1 = Bottom third  
0 = otherwise 
 GCT Score  GCT  Continuous Add 1 for each 
additional point 
scored 
 MOS Preference 
Received 
First MOS  Binary  1 = Received first 
MOS choice  
0 = otherwise 
  Second 
MOS  
Binary  1 = Received 
second MOS choice 
0 = otherwise 
  Third MOS  Binary  1 = Received third 
MOS choice  
0 = otherwise 
  Other MOS  Binary  1 = Didn’t receive 
one of first 3 MOS 
choices  





Binary  1 = Combat Arms 
MOS  





Description Variable  Variable 
Type 
Range 
  Combat 
Service 
Support 
Binary  1 = CSS MOS  
0 = otherwise 
  Air-Ground 
Support 
Binary  1 = Air-Ground 
Support MOS  
0 = otherwise 





Binary  1 = PMOS  
0 = otherwise 










 Education Status Civmasters  Binary  1=Ever Earned a 
Master’s Degree  
0=otherwise 
 Wounded in 
Action Status 
WIA  Binary  1=Wounded in 
Action 0=otherwise 




Binary  1 = Fiscal Year  
0 = otherwise 
 
Descriptive statistics are a useful snapshot of the data that is being analyzed. They 
provide the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, and the minimum and 
maximum values for each variable. A complete list of the descriptive statistics for the 
USMC data is shown in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
tbs_th 6114 2.044652 .8285762 1 3 
t_cl_std 6114 119.1412 69.40322 1 287 
tbs_fy 6114 1997.948 2.592593 1994 2002 
WIA 6114 .0157017 .1243288 0 1 
Female 6114 .0904482 .2868462 0 1 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Male 6114 .9095518 .2868462 0 1 
White 6114 .8104351 .3919888 0 1 
Black 6114 .0914295 .2882425 0 1 
Hispanic 6114 .0785083 .2689919 0 1 
Asian 6114 .0196271 .1387264 0 1 
o2_married 6114 .4370298 .4960595 0 1 
o2_single 6114 .5405626 .4983927 0 1 
o2_divorced 6114 .0224076 .1480171 0 1 
o2_depndts 6114 .6975793 1.06056 0 7 
GCT 6114 124.2715 9.629784 99 159 
Civmasters 6114 .0973176 .296414 0 1 
Top 6114 .3218842 .4672371 0 1 
Middle 6114 .31158 .4631771 0 1 
Lower 6114 .3665358 .4818976 0 1 
MOSpr1 5837 1948.954 2399.669 0 7804 
MOSpr2 5837 1969.377 2309.453 0 7599 
MOSpr3 5836 2163.203 2361.63 0 7720 
PMOS 6114 1764.542 2169.834 180 7220 
PR1 6114 .4317959 .4953669 0 1 
PR2 6114 .1411515 .3482062 0 1 
PR3 6114 .0925744 .2898588 0 1 
PRtop3 6114 .6655218 .4718463 0 1 
PRother 6114 .3344782 .4718463 0 1 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
m0302 6114 .2219496 .4155914 0 1 
m0802 6114 .0917566 .2887057 0 1 
m1302 6114 .047105 .2118808 0 1 
m1802 6114 .0206084 .1420811 0 1 
m1803 6114 .0132483 .1143455 0 1 
CA 6114 .394668 .4888192 0 1 
m0180 6114 .0448152 .2069149 0 1 
m0202 6114 .0006542 .0255718 0 1 
m0203 6114 .0340203 .1812961 0 1 
m0204 6114 .0063788 .0796188 0 1 
m0206 6114 .0210991 .1437266 0 1 
m0207 6114 .0202813 .1409725 0 1 
m0402 6114 .114982 .3190263 0 1 
m0602 6114 .0713117 .2573659 0 1 
m2501 6114 .0029441 .0541837 0 1 
m2502 6114 .0112856 .1056411 0 1 
m3002 6114 .0762185 .2653691 0 1 
m3404 6114 .031894 .1757323 0 1 
m3502 6114 .0193 .1375884 0 1 
m4002 6114 .0071966 .0845339 0 1 
m4302 6114 .0127576 .112236 0 1 
m5803 6114 .0209356 .1431804 0 1 
CSS 6114 .4960746 .5000255 0 1 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
m6002 6114 .0274779 .1634847 0 1 
m6602 6114 .0210991 .1437266 0 1 
m7204 6114 .0073602 .085482 0 1 
m7208 6114 .0237161 .1521755 0 1 
m7210 6114 .016683 .1280913 0 1 
m7220 6114 .0112856 .1056411 0 1 
m7201 6114 .0016356 .0404127 0 1 
AGS 6114 .1092574 .3119875 0 1 
ECP 6114 .0001636 .012789 0 1 
MCP 6114 .0176644 .1317391 0 1 
MECEP 6114 .0487406 .2153428 0 1 
OCC 6114 .3117435 .4632436 0 1 
PLC 6114 .2690546 .4435047 0 1 
NROTC 6114 .2317632 .421993 0 1 
USNA 6114 .1208701 .326003 0 1 
fy_00 6114 .1081125 .3105479 0 1 
fy_01 6114 .117599 .322159 0 1 
fy_02 6114 .0987897 .2984038 0 1 
fy_03 6114 .1354269 .342207 0 1 
fy_04 6114 .1293752 .3356422 0 1 
fy_05 6114 .1442591 .351381 0 1 
fy_07 6114 .1432777 .3503845 0 1 
fy_08 6114 .12316 .3286476 0 1 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SEP 6114 .0062152 .0785979 0 1 
FAO 6114 .0003271 .0180849 0 1 
RAO 6114 .0001636 .012789 0 1 
IAOP 6114 .0004907 .0221476 0 1 
Prior 6114 .328263 .4696195 0 1 
Retained 6114 .1746811 .3797251 0 1 
Daysdepl 6114 3.309944 2.949481 0 21 
Rank 6114 3500.66 2030.48 1 7044 
 
Only the key variables were selected for inclusion in the retention model. The 
choice of variables was guided by the information that was obtained during the literature 
review. The literature review highlighted several factors that were correlated with 
employee retention, both in the military and civilian communities. The following seven 
variables were chosen: 
a. MOS preference achievement, 
b. Gender, 
c. Race / ethnicity, 
d. Marital status, 
e. Number of dependents, 
f. Prior enlisted history, and 
g. Education. 
The dependant variable that was developed was a binary variable for retention of 
the six years. The variable is defined as “one” if the officer has six or more years of 
service and “zero” if the officer has less than six years service. A period of six years was 
chosen because the minimum service requirement is either four or five years, depending 
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on commissioning source. A six-year dependant variable allows for the variance in 
operational requirements, individual circumstances, and service extensions.  
The model that was developed was a simple linear probability model (a multiple 
linear regression model with a binary dependant variable). It can be expressed in the 
following manner: 
Retained 6 years = β1*MOS first Preference Achievement + β2*MOS 
second Preference Achievement + β3*MOS Preference Achievement not 
in top 3 + β4*White + β5*Black + β6*Hispanic + β7*Married + 
β8*Number of Dependents + β9*Prior Enlisted + β7*Education (civilian 
masters) + β8*FY dummy variables + u 
When the model was run in Stata, the results showed that there are significant 
differences between the retention dynamics of USMC officers who receive their first 
MOS preference and those who were allocated to an MOS that was outside of their top 
three choices. The independent variable for first MOS preference is positive and 
significant at a 10% level of significance; the coefficient for receiving first MOS is 
0.05299. The independent variable for second MOS preference is slightly negative with a 
coefficient of -0.01122. The independent variable for other MOS preferences (outside the 
top three) is negative and significant at a 10% level of significance; the coefficient for 
receiving other MOS preference is -0.01408.  
The results from the regression analysis show the overall goodness-of-fit of the 
model is reasonable as the R-squared value is 0.31. An R-squared value of 0.31 means 
that for the USMC officers who remained serving until the six year mark, 31% of the 
reason why they remained is explained by the variables contained in the model. This 
result is quite strong when consideration is given to the wide range of factors that shape 
retention. A full summary of the regression results from Stata are contained in Table 6.  
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Table 6.   Regression Results: Retained to Six Years after Commissioning 
Retained Coef.    Std. Err. t     P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
PR1 .0529902    .0146892 0.36 0.071 -.0234968     .0340951 
PR2 -.0112213    .0171423 -0.95 0.344 -.0498263     .0173837 
PRother -.0140822    .0151428 -0.93 0.092 -.0437675     .0156031 
White -.0367105    .0293285 -1.25 0.211 -.0942046     .0207837 
Black -.0433671    .0319521 -1.36 0.175 -.1060046     .0192704 
Hispanic -.0599217    .0323702 -1.85 0.064 -.1233788     .0035353 
o2_married .0780739    .0116064 6.73 0.000 .0553212     .1008265 
o2_depndts -.0149546    .0056986 -2.62 0.009 -.0261258    -.0037834 
Prior .0327939    .0095865 3.42 0.001 .0140011     .0515867 
Civmasters .220412    .0139416 15.81 0.000 .1930815     .2477426 
fy_00 -.0177122     .018145 -0.98 0.329 -.0532829     .0178584 
fy_01 -.0328364    .0176147 -1.86 0.062 -.0673674     .0016946 
fy_03 -.2088375    .0170232 -12.27 0.000 -.242209     -.175466 
fy_04 -.4350163    .0171521 -25.36 0.000 -.4686404    -.4013922 
fy_05 -.4403418    .0167816 -26.24 0.000 -.4732396    -.4074441 
fy_07 -.4256419    .0169134 -25.17 0.000 -.4587981    -.3924858 
fy_08 -.4232119     .017459 -24.24 0.000 -.4574377    -.3889861 
_cons .4288801    .0345901 12.40 0.000 .3610713     .4966888 
 
Source  SS        df MS     Number of obs =    6114 
Model  270.4 17 15.911332    F( 17,  6096) =  158.76 
Residual  610.9 6096 .100221126 Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Total  881.4 6113 .144191171    R-squared     =  0.3069 
         Adj R-squared =  0.3049 
         Root MSE      =  .31658 
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The regression significance results from the Stata regression are contained in 
Table 7. 








































F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The regression results contained in Tables 6 and 7 are the result of a linear 
probability model. They measured the change in probability of success (retention) when 
the variables changed, holding all other factors constant or fixed. The results showed that 
remaining in the military beyond an MSO was positively affected by receiving a first 
MOS preference, prior service, being a male, being married, and having a master’s 
degree. Remaining in the military beyond an MSO was negatively affected by the 
following factors: receiving an MOS outside the top three preferences, being Hispanic, 
and having a higher number of dependents. 
The military is like any organization in that officer retention is a critical element 
of manpower planning. The importance of officer retention is further reinforced by the 
very nature of military recruiting systems. There is very limited lateral entry into the 
system, and it is therefore essential to recruit, promote, retain, and discharge an 
appropriate number of personnel. The results from the six-year regression model verified 
that the allocation of cadets to an MOS is a very important element within the retention 
framework of military officers. Many of the men and women who choose to enter the 
military have a specific MOS that they desire to serve within; not being allocated to this 
Observations 6114 
R-squared 0.307 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Significant at 1%*** p<0.01 
Significant at 5%** p<0.05, 
Significant at 10%* p<0.1 
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MOS can be a shattering experience. Failing to secure a high MOS preference 
significantly and negatively impacts retention beyond an officer’s minimum service 
obligation. It is essential that officer accession sources maximize the number of cadets 
who receive a high-order MOS preference. 
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IV. ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE MODELING ANALYSIS  
A. SCOPE 
The purpose of this chapter is to define the Australian Army corps allocation 
process and to develop models that optimize both organizational and individual 
outcomes. Firstly, the chapter will cover the Corps’ allocation process that currently 
occurs at the Royal Military College Duntroon (RMC). Secondly, this chapter will 
develop models that will allow RMC staff to detail weighting for specific variables whilst 
also maximizing the percentage of staff cadets (cadets) receiving their first or second 
corps preference.  
The cost of training each cadet to become a junior officer in the Australian Army 
is extremely high. It is imperative every effort is made to provide each cadet with a 
rewarding career in their chosen field. The first step in this process is achieving a corps 
allocation that maximizes the cadet’s preferences whilst also meeting the requirements of 
Army. Accurate models are needed to help the Australian Army develop corps allocation 
processes that will retain a sufficient number of officers who have the right qualities. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In 1974, the decision was made that all initial Army officer training would be 
centralized at RMC. Accordingly, in 1986, RMC took over the training responsibilities 
from all other full-time Army officer training establishments, including the Officer Cadet 
School at Portsea, Victoria; the Women’s Officer Training Wing at Georges Heights, 
Sydney, New South Wales; and the Specialist Officer training wing at Canungra, 
Queensland. Beginning in 1986, RMC has provided a course of between 12–18 months in 
duration. Upon graduation from RMC, cadets are commissioned as lieutenants in the 
Australian Army.  
Generally, direct intakes occur every January and July, and all direct-entry cadets 
undertake an 18-month training program. New officer candidates enlist as third-class 
cadets and progress to second-class cadets after six months; they become first-class 
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cadets after 12 months. Graduates of the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) 
join at the beginning of each calendar year and are amalgamated with the new second-
class cadets. The RMC direct-entry cadets and ADFA graduates then spend their final 12 
months of officer training together. 
The charter of RMC is to prepare cadets and other selected candidates for careers 
in the Army. Cadets are prepared for their careers via leadership training that promotes 
integrity, high ideals, the pursuit of excellence, and a sense of duty, loyalty, and service 
to the nation. The mission of RMC is to produce officers capable of commanding platoon 
groups in the hardened and networked Army and to prepare specialist candidates for 
commissioning. Toward the end of their time at RMC, each cadet nominates four corps in 
which they would like to serve upon graduation. The cadets list the corps in order from 
most desired to least desired. 
The RMC structure includes the following elements:  
 Headquarters RMC—including the Commandant , Director of Military Art 
and the Director of Army Reserve Training; 
 Military Art and Training Wing; 
 Army Reserve Training Development Wing; and 
 Corps of Staff Cadets (which consists of the five cadet Companies). 
C. CURRENT PROCESS 
Allocating cadets to a specific corps is handled by the Corps Allocation Board 
(CAB). The CAB is generally comprised of the following personnel: RMC staff, 
Directorate of Officer Career Management (DOCM-A) staff, and members from the 
Directorate of Personnel Army (DPERS-A). The purpose of the CAB is to assign cadets 
to a specific corps fairly whilst adhering to the manning requirements. The process is 
intended to give due regard to cadet preferences whilst adhering to the manning 




a. army manning requirements; 
b. cadet preferences; 
c. assessment of the person as a whole, including: 
(1) officer qualities, 
(2) academic performance, 
(3) performance fit, 
(4) participation, 
(5) leadership and teamwork, 
(6) conduct, and 
(7) negative selection (i.e., CP33). 
d. distribution of ability; 
e. gender proportionality (where applicable), and 
f. medical restrictions. 
D.  OPTIMIZATION MODELING 
Optimization modeling is a type of mathematical modeling that attempts to 
optimize (maximize or minimize) an objective function without violating resource 
constraints. In essence, optimization modeling finds the answer that yields the best result, 
given the specified constraints. It could be the answer that attains the highest profit, 
output, or utility. Alternatively, it could be the answer that achieves the lowest cost, 
waste, or minimizes losses. Optimization problems often involve making the most 
efficient use of a finite resource. The resources could be money, time, machine hours, 
labor, inventory, office space, or job functions. The range of optimization problems is as 
wide as the range of techniques available to solve them. Optimization problems are often 
classified as either linear or nonlinear, depending on whether the objectives and 
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constraints in the problem are linear with respect to the variables. There are a variety of 
software packages to solve optimization problems. This thesis will utilize an optimization 
tool that is inbuilt within Microsoft (Excel): the program is called “solver.”   
All optimization models that utilize solver are defined by the following three 
elements: 
a. decision variables (changing cells), 
b. objective function, and 
c. constraints. 
Figure 1 shows how the solver parameters are displayed in Excel.  
 
Figure 1.   Solver Parameters 
The basic goal of solver is to adjust the value of the decision variables to either 
minimize or maximize the objective function while satisfying the constraints. A solution 
value for decision variables, where all of the constraints are satisfied, is called a feasible 
solution. The way solver processes an optimization problem is by first finding a feasible 
solution, then seeking to improve upon it, and finally changing the decision variables to 
move from one feasible solution to a better feasible solution. This process is repeated 
until the objective function has reached its maximum or minimum; this result is called an 
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optimal solution. For the objective function to describe the behavior of the measure of 
effectiveness, it must capture the relationship between that measure and the decision 
variables that cause it to change. A decision variable is a variable that can be directly 
controlled by the decision maker.  
1. Decision Variables 
Decision variables are the cells on the Excel spreadsheet that the decision maker 
can change or adjust to optimize the target cell. The cells in which these amounts are 
recorded are the changing cells in this model. They usually measure the resources, such 
as money, to be allocated to an activity. In this thesis, the decision variables are the 
corps’ assignments for each individual cadet. Therefore, the total number of decision 
variables equals the number of different corps available multiplied by the number of 
cadets who need to be allocated to a corps. The decision variables are binary, assuming a 
value of one if the cadet is assigned to that corps and zero otherwise. The vast number of 
decision variables highlights the difficulty of the corps’ allocation process.  
2. Objective Function 
Once you have defined the decision variables, the next step is to define the 
objective function. The objective function depends on the decision variables. In this 
thesis, the objective function has been formulated as a maximizing cell that is increased 
by higher cadet preference achievement.  
3. Defining Constraints 
In most models, constraints play a key role in determining what values the 
decision variables can assume and what objective values can be attained. Constraints are 
restrictions you place on the changing cells. To define a constraint, you first compute a 
value based on the decision variables. Then, you place a limit (<=, = or >=) on this 
computed value. In this thesis, the key constraint is the number of positions that are 
available in each corps. Therefore, the constraint will be expressed as sum of decision 
variables (cadets allocated to corps A) = the value of the constraint (number of positions 
available with corps A).  
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Solver also allows you to specify that all decision variables are integers (whole 
numbers). A particularly useful type of integer constraint specifies that a variable must 
have an integer value with a lower bound of 0, and an upper bound of 1. This forces the 
variable to be either 0 or 1, hence it can be used to model  “yes / no” decisions. This type 
of constraint was essential to this thesis as each decision variable needed to be an integer, 
either a cadet was allocated to corps A or they were not allocated to corps A. 
4. Interpreting Solver Solutions 
A solution or set of values for the decision variables in which all of the constraints 
in the Solver model are satisfied is called a “feasible solution.” Solver attempts to firstly 
find a feasible solution and then improve it by finding another feasible solution that 
increases (or decreases) the value of the objective function. An optimal solution is a 
feasible solution wherein the objective function reaches a maximum (or minimum) value.  
Data was obtained from RMC for cadets who graduated in 2008 and 2009. This 
data contained a complete list of each cadet’s: corps preferences, actual allocation, and 
Queens medal score. This data will be used to build models that maximize cadet 
preferences whilst also meeting service requirements. 
E. DATA 
The benchmark data that the optimization models were compared against is actual 
corps preferences and allocations from the 2008 and 2009 RMC graduating classes. The 
only modification made to the data is to: 
a. remove all foreign student (the do not receive a corps allocation), and 
b. names have been replaced with numbers (to ensure privacy). 
1. 2008 Data 
Data was obtained from the RMC graduating class of 2008. Table 8 shows a 




Table 8.   Corps Preferences and Allocation (2008) 
Name       Actual  First  Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref Pref achievement 
1 AAAVN AAAVN AUSTINT RAAMC RACT 1 
2 AAAVN AAAVN RAINF RAAC RAE 1 
3 AAAVN AAAVN RAEME NIL NIL 1 
4 AUSTINT AUSTINT RAAC RASIGS RAAMC 1 
5 AUSTINT AUSTINT RACT RAAOC RAE 1 
6 AUSTINT AUSTINT RAAC RACMP RAINF 1 
7 AUSTINT AUSTINT RASIGS RACT RAEME 1 
8 AUSTINT AUSTINT RAE RACT RASIGS 1 
9 AUSTINT AUSTINT RAAC RACT RAAOC 1 
10 AUSTINT AUSTINT RASIGS RAAMC RACT 1 
11 AUSTINT AUSTINT RASIGS RAAMC RACT 1 
12 RAA RAA RAEME RASIGS AAAVN 1 
13 RAA RAA RAAC RAINF AUSTINT 1 
14 RAA RAA RAEME RACT RACMP 1 
15 RAA RAAMC RASIGS RAE AUSTINT 5 
16 RAA RAAC RAA RASIGS RACT 2 
17 RAA AUSTINT RAINF RAA RAAC 3 
18 RAA RAA RAAC RASIGS RACT 1 
19 RAA RAA RACMP RAINF RAEME 1 
20 RAA RAINF RAE RASIGS RAA 4 
21 RAA RACMP RACT RAA RASIGS 3 
22 RAAC RAINF RAAC RAE RACT 2 
23 RAAC RAAC AUSTINT RAE RACT 1 
24 RAAC RAINF RAAC AUSTINT RAAMC 2 
25 RAAC RAAC RAE RAINF RACT 1 
26 RAAC RAINF RAAC RACMP AUSTINT 2 
27 RAAC RAAC RAINF AUSTINT RAE 1 
28 RAAC RAINF RAAC RAAOC RAE 2 
29 RAAC RAAC RAINF RACT RAAOC 1 
30 RAAMC RAAMC RASIGS RACT RACMP 1 
31 RAAMC RAAMC RAINF RAAC AUSTINT 1 
32 RAAOC RAE RASIGS RACT RAAOC 4 
33 RAAOC RAAOC RACT RAAMC RAA 1 
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Name       Actual First  Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref Pref achievement
34 RAAOC RAAOC RACT RASIGS RAEME 1 
35 RAAOC RAAOC RACT RACMP RASIGS 1 
36 RAAOC RASIGS RAAOC RACT RACMP 2 
37 RAAOC RAAOC RASIGS RAE RACMP 1 
38 RAAOC AUSTINT RASIGS RACT N/A 5 
39 RAAOC AUSTINT RAA RASIGS RAAC 5 
40 RAAOC RACMP RAAOC RAE RASIGS 2 
41 RAAOC RAAOC RACT RASIGS RAAMC 1 
42 RACMP RACMP RACT RAAMC RAAOC 1 
43 RACMP RACMP RACT RAAOC RAEME 1 
44 RACMP RACMP RAE AUSTINT RAAC 1 
45 RACMP RAINF RAAC RACMP RAE 3 
46 RACT RACT RAE RAEME RAAOC 1 
47 RACT RASIGS RACT RAAOC RAEME 2 
48 RACT AUSTINT RACT RAE RASIGS 2 
49 RACT RACT AUSTINT RAEME RAAOC 1 
50 RACT RACT RASIGS RACMP RAAOC 1 
51 RACT RAAC RACT RAE RASIGS 2 
52 RACT RACT RAAMC RAAOC RACMP 1 
53 RACT AUSTINT RASIGS RACT RAAOC 3 
54 RACT RAAMC RACT RAAOC AUSTINT 2 
55 RACT RACT RAAOC RACMP RASIGS 1 
56 RAE RAINF RAE RAAC RACMP 2 
57 RAE RAAC RAE RAINF RACMP 2 
58 RAE RAE RAINF RASIGS RAAOC 1 
59 RAE RAINF AUSTINT RAAC RAE 4 
60 RAE RAE AUSTINT RAAC RASIGS 1 
61 RAE RAE RACT RAAOC RASIGS 1 
62 RAE RAE RAAC RAINF AUSTINT 1 
63 RAE RAA RAE RASIGS RAAMC 2 
64 RAEME RAINF RACT RAEME RASIGS 3 
65 RAEME RAAC RASIGS RACT RAEME 4 
66 RAEME RAEME RACC RAPC AUSTINT 1 
67 RAEME RAEME RASIGS RAAOC RACT 1 
68 RAEME AUSTINT RASIGS RACT RAEME 4 
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Name       Actual First  Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref Pref achievement
69 RAEME RAAC RACT RAEME RAAOC 3 
70 RAINF RAINF AUSTINT RAAC RACMP 1 
71 RAINF RAINF AUSTINT RAAC RAAMC 1 
72 RAINF RAINF RAAC RASIGS AUSTINT 1 
73 RAINF RAINF RAAC RAE RACMP 1 
74 RAINF RAINF RAE RAAC AUSTINT 1 
75 RAINF RAINF RAAC AUSTINT RACMP 1 
76 RAINF RAINF RAAC RACMP RAE 1 
77 RAINF RAINF RAAC AUSTINT RASIGS 1 
78 RAINF RAINF RACMP RASIGS RACT 1 
79 RAINF RAINF RAAC AUSTINT RASIGS 1 
80 RAINF RAINF RAAC RAAMC AUSTINT 1 
81 RAINF RAINF RAEME RACT RAE 1 
82 RAINF RAINF AUSTINT RAAC RASIGS 1 
83 RAINF RAINF RAAC AAAVN RAE 1 
84 RAINF RAINF RAAC RAE AUSTINT 1 
85 RASIGS RASIGS AUSTINT RAAOC RACT 1 
86 RASIGS RASIGS RAAMC RACT RAAOC 1 
87 RASIGS RASIGS RACT RAAOC AUSTINT 1 
88 RASIGS RAE RASIGS RAEME RAAOC 2 
89 RASIGS RAE RAA RAAMC RAAOC 5 
90 RASIGS RASIGS RAEME AUSTINT RAAOC 1 
91 RASIGS RASIGS RAINF RAA RAAOC 1 
92 RASIGS RASIGS AUSTINT RAAOC RACT 1 
93 RASIGS RASIGS RACT RAAMC RAAC 1 
94 RASIGS RASIGS AUSTINT RACMP RAAOC 1 
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A summary of the actual preference breakdown for 2008 is contained in Table 9.  
Table 9.   Actual Preference Achievement (2008) 
Summary Number Percentage 
First preference 64 68.09% 
Second preference 15 15.96% 
Third preference 6 6.38% 
Fourth preference 5 5.32% 
Other (5) 4 4.26% 
 94 100% 
 
A graphical representation of the actual preference breakdown for 2008 is 
contained in Table 10.  
Table 10.   Graphical Preference Achievement (2008)  






















2. 2009 Data 
Data was obtained from RMC graduating class of 2009. Table 11 shows a each 
cadet's corps allocation, corps preferences, and preference achievement. 
Table 11.   Cadet Preferences and Corps Allocation for RMC (2009) 
Name Actual  First    Pref Second Pref Third  Pref Fourth Pref Pref achievement 
1 AAAVN AAAVN RAAC RAE RASIGS 1 
2 AAAVN AAAVN RAE RAEME RAA 1 
3 AAAVN AAAVN AUSTINT RAAC RASIGS 1 
4 AAAVN AAAVN RACT RAE RACMP 1 
5 AAAVN AAAVN AUSTINT RAE RACMP 1 
6 AAAVN AAAVN RAAC RAINF RAA 1 
7 AAAVN AAAVN RAINF RAAC RAEME 1 
8 AACC AACC RACT RAAMC RAAOC 1 
9 AACC AACC RASIGS RACT RAAOC 1 
10 AUSTINT AUSTINT RAE RAEME RACT 1 
11 AUSTINT AUSTINT RAEME RASIGS RACT 1 
12 AUSTINT AUSTINT RASIGS RAE RACT 1 
13 AUSTINT AUSTINT RAAC RAAOC RAEME 1 
14 AUSTINT AUSTINT RASIGS RACT RAEME 1 
15 AUSTINT AUSTINT RAE RASIGS RAAC 1 
16 AUSTINT AUSTINT RASIGS RACT RAAMC 1 
17 RAA RAAC RAA RACMP RAEME 2 
18 RAA RAA RACT RAEME RASIGS 1 
19 RAA RAA RACT RAAOC RASIGS 5 
20 RAA RAA RACT RAE RACMP 1 
21 RAA RAA RAINF RAE RAEME 1 
22 RAA RAA AUSTINT RAINF RACMP 1 
23 RAA RAAC RAINF RAA RACT 5 
24 RAAC RAAC RAE RAEME RASIGS 1 
25 RAAC RAAC RAINF RAE RACT 1 
26 RAAC RAAC RAINF RAA RACT 1 
27 RAAC RAAC RASIGS RAE RACMP 1 
28 RAAC RAAC RAINF AUSTINT RAE 1 
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Name Actual  First    Pref Second Pref Third  Pref Fourth Pref Pref achievement
29 RAAC RAAC RAINF RAE RACMP 1 
30 RAAMC RAAMC RAAOC AUSTINT RACT 1 
31 RAAMC RAAMC RAAOC RACT RAE 1 
32 RAAOC RAAOC RASIGS RACT RAE 1 
33 RAAOC RAAOC RACT RAEME RAE 1 
34 RAAOC RASIGS AUSTINT RAE RACT 5 
35 RAAOC RACT RAAOC RAEME RASIGS 2 
36 RAAOC RAAOC RAEME RACT RAAMC 1 
37 RAAOC AUSTINT RAAC RAINF RAEME 5 
38 RAAOC RAAC RAAOC RAEME RACT 2 
39 RACMP RACMP RASIGS RAE RAEME 1 
40 RACMP RAINF RACMP RAA RAAOC 2 
41 RACMP RACMP RAINF RACT RAE 1 
42 RACT RACT RASIGS AUSTINT RAAMC 1 
43 RACT RACT RAE RAAOC RASIGS 1 
44 RACT RAE RACT RAEME RASIGS 2 
45 RACT RACT RAAMC RAAOC AUSTINT 1 
46 RACT RAE RACT RAEME AUSTINT 2 
47 RAE RAE AUSTINT RAAC RAA 1 
48 RAE RAE RAEME RACT RAA 1 
49 RAE RAE RASIGS RACT RAA 1 
50 RAE RAE RASIGS RAA AAAVN 1 
51 RAE RAE RAAC RAINF AUSTINT 1 
52 RAE RAAC RAE RAA RACT 5 
53 RAEME RAEME AUSTINT RASIGS RAE 1 
54 RAEME RAEME RACT RAAOC RASIGS 1 
55 RAEME RAE RAEME RACT RAA 2 
56 RAEME RAE RAEME RASIGS RAA 2 
57 RAEME RAEME RAAC RASIGS RACMP 1 
58 RAEME RAE RAEME RACT RASIGS 2 
59 RAEME RAE RAEME RASIGS RACT 2 
60 RAEME RAE RAEME RACT RAA 2 
61 RAINF RAINF RAAC RAE RACT 1 
62 RAINF RAINF RAAC RAE RAA 1 
63 RAINF RAINF RAAC RACMP RAE 1 
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Name Actual  First    Pref Second Pref Third  Pref Fourth Pref Pref achievement
64 RAINF RAINF RAAC AUSTINT RACMP 1 
65 RAINF RAINF AUSTINT RACT RAE 1 
66 RAINF RAINF RAAC RAE RAA 1 
67 RAINF RAINF RAAOC RAA RAE 1 
68 RAINF RAINF RAAC RAE RAAMC 1 
69 RAINF RAINF RAAC RAE RACT 1 
70 RAINF RAINF RAAC RAA RACT 1 
71 RAINF RAINF AUSTINT RAAC RAE 1 
72 RAINF RAINF RAAC RAA RACT 1 
73 RAINF RAINF RAE RAEME RACT 1 
74 RASIGS RASIGS AUSTINT RAINF RAAOC 1 
75 RASIGS RASIGS AUSTINT RAINF RAEME 1 
76 RASIGS AUSTINT RAA RASIGS RAEME 3 
77 RASIGS RAA RASIGS RAEME RACT 2 
78 RASIGS RASIGS RACMP RAA RAEME 1 
79 RASIGS RAAMC RACT RASIGS RACMP 3 
80 RASIGS RASIGS RAE RACT RAAOC 1 
81 RASIGS AUSTINT RASIGS RAE RAEME 2 
82 RASIGS RAE RASIGS RACT RAAOC 2 
A summary of the actual preference breakdown for 2009 is contained in Table 12. 
Table 12.   Preference Achievement (2009) 
Summary Number Percentage 
First preferences 62 75.61% 
Second preferences 15 18.29% 
Third preferences 3 3.66% 
Fourth preferences 0 0.00% 
Other 2 2.44% 
 82 100.00% 
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A graphical representation of the actual preference achievement for 2009 is 
contained in Table 13. 
Table 13.   Graphical Preferences Achievement (2009) 






















A summary of the actual preference achievement over the period 2008 / 2009 is 
contained in Table 14. 
Table 14.    Preference Achievement (2008 and 2009) 
Summary Number Percentage 
First preferences 126 71.59% 
Second preferences 30 17.05% 
Third preferences 9 5.11% 
Fourth preferences 5 2.84% 
Other 6 3.41% 
 176 100.00% 
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A graphical representation of the actual preference achievement for 2008 / 2009 is 
contained in Table 15. 
Table 15.   Graphical Preferences Achievement (2008 /2009)  






















F. MODEL ASSESSMENT 
In order to effectively rank and assess optimization models, it is useful to define a 
set of criteria that they will be assessed against. Chapter II concluded that the majority of 
academics concur that recognition and reward of performance are important elements of 
the retention dynamic. Therefore, “performance recognition” will be one of the factors 
against which each model will be assessed. Chapter III developed a linear probability 
model that utilized USMC data. The results showed that remaining in the military beyond 
a minimum service obligation was positively affected by receiving your first Military 
Occupational Specialties (MOS) preference, and was negatively affected by receiving a 
lower order MOS preference. Therefore, “maximizing first preferences” and “minimizing 
third, fourth and no preference” will both be categories that the models will be assessed 
against. Each model will be given a score of either: high, medium or low in relation to 
each of the three assessment categories. If a model performs well in relation to a category 
it will receive a grading of high, and if it performs poorly it will be assessed a grading of 
low.  
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G. MODEL 1 (WEIGHTED FOR CADET PREFERENCE) 
The first optimization model that was developed utilized the number of positions 
that were available and sought to maximize the number of cadets receiving an allocation 
that was highest in their preferences. The inputs to the model were decision variables, 
objective function, and constraints. 
The decision variables were a function of the number of cadets that needed to be 
allocated to a corps multiplied by the number of different corps that where available. For 
the 2008 model, there were 12 possible corps available and 94 cadets who required an 
allocation. The number of decision variables is a function of these two figures; therefore, 
for the 2008 model there were 1,128 decision variables. For the 2009 model, there were 
13 possible corps and 82 cadets; therefore, there were 1,066 decision variables. A sample 
of the 2008 Model 1 decision variable is highlighted in Table 16.   
Table 16.   Decision Variables (Model 1) 
CORPS 
 A B C D E F G H I J K 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
…..            








94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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There were four constraints for Model 1. The first was that the sum of all the 
allocations had to equal the sum of the available corps positions. The first constraint 
means that the sum of each in column (corps) has to equal the number of available corps 
positions. Secondly, the value of each decision variable had to be a whole number 
(integer). This means that every value allocated to the shaded portion of Table 16 had to 
be a whole number; no cell or value could be a fraction. Thirdly, the value of the decision 
variable had to be non-negative. Non-negativity ensured that a large positive value was 
not offset by a correspondingly large negative value. Fourthly, each cadet had to be 
allocated to one and only one corps. In Table 17, the result is that each row was required 
to have a total value equal to one; this means that each cadet is allocated to only one 
corps.   
Table 17.   Constraints (Model 1) 
CORPS 
 A B C D E F G H I J K 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
…..            








94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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The objective function for Model 1 was a function of the number of cadets 
achieving their first, second, third, fourth, or other preference, multiplied by the 
weighting given to each preference. The aim of the objective function was to achieve the 
maximum possible weighted score. Solver sought to maximize the objective function by 
matching the highest possible number of cadets with a high preference. The result for the 
objective function in Model 1 (2008) was a figure of 2,028. The preference achievements 
and weightings for the 2008 model are contained in Table 18.  
Table 18.   2008 Weightings and Preference Achievement (Model 1) 
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref Other 
Number 69 19 3 3 0 
Weight 25 15 5 1 -20 
 
When solver was run for Model 1 (2008), the result was an increase in the number 
of cadets receiving both their first and second preferences. There was a drop in the 
number of cadets receiving their third, fourth or no preference. The results from 2008 
show that Model 1 ensured 73% of cadets received their first choice corps, compared to 
68% in the actual allocation. In the model allocation, only 6% of cadets would have 
received their third, fourth, or no preference, compared to 16% in the actual allocation. 
The actual 2008 preference achievement and the proposed Model 1 (2008) allocation are 
compared in Table 19. 
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Table 19.   2008 Preference Achievement (Original Allocation and Model 1) 
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 2008 64 15 6 5 4 
Actual 2008 
(percentage) 
68.09% 15.96% 6.38% 5.32% 4.26% 
Model 1 2008 69 19 3 3 0 
Model 1 2008  
(percentage) 
73.40% 20.21% 3.19% 3.19% 0.00% 
Difference 
(number) 
+5 +4 -3 -2 -4 
Difference 
(percentage) 
5.32% 4.26% -3.19% -2.13% -4.26% 
 
Running solver for Model 1 (2009) increased the number of cadets receiving both 
their first and second preferences, and decreased the number of cadets receiving their 
third or no preference. These results from 2009 show that Model 1 provided 79% of 
cadets their first choice corps, compared to 75% in the actual allocation. In the model 
allocation only 1% of cadets received their third, fourth or no preference, compared to 
6% in the actual allocation. The actual 2009 preference achievement and the proposed 
Model 1 (2009) allocation are compared in Table 20. 
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Table 20.   2009 Preference Achievement  (Original Allocation and Model 1) 
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 2009 62 15 3 0 2 
Actual 2009 
(percentage) 
75.61% 18.30% 3.66% 0.00% 2.44% 
Model 1 2009 65 16 1 0 0 
Model 1 2009 
(percentage) 
79.26% 19.51% 1.22% 0.00% 0.00% 
Difference 
(number) 
+3 +1 -2 0 -2 
Difference 
(percentage) 
3.66% 1.22% -2.44% 0.00% -2.44% 
 
The best measure of the effectiveness of any model is to compare the new results 
to the benchmark results. A comparison of the benchmark data and the results from 
Model 1 are shown in Table 21. The table shows that the optimization model produces 
significant increases in the percentage of cadets receiving their first or second preferences 
and a significant reduction in the percentage of cadets receiving their third, fourth, or no 
preference. The model significantly increases the number of cadets who receive higher 
order preferences whilst reducing the number of cadets who receive less favorable 
preferences.  
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Table 21.   Model 1 Preference Achievement (2008 and 2009 Combined)  
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 
(number) 
126 30 9 5 6 
Actual 
(percentage) 
71.59% 17.05% 5.11% 2.84% 3.41% 
Model 1 
(number) 
134 35 4 3 0 
Model 1 
(percentage) 
76.14% 19.89% 2.27% 1.70% 0.00% 
Difference 
(number) 
8 5 -5 -2 -6 
Difference 
(percentage) 
+4.55% +2.84% -2.84% -1.14% -3.41% 
 
The results from Table 21 show that Model 1 provides a distinct improvement in 
corps allocation that values cadet preferences. The performance of Model 1 in relation to 
the three performance criteria is shown in Table 22.  
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Table 22.   Model 1 Performance 
Criteria Grade 
Performance recognition Low 
Maximizing first preferences High 
Minimizing third, fourth and no preference High 
Overall performance Medium 
 
Model 1 does not take into account a cadet’s performance or Queens medal score 
in allocating corps. The benefit of excluding performance as a driver for the allocation 
process is that it aids in the even distribution of talent throughout each of the separate 
corps. The militaries of many countries have actually developed policies that ensure each 
of their corps is allocated an appropriate talent mix.  
The USMC has a specific policy that ensures an even spread of talent and ability 
throughout each of the Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). Every USMC lieutenant 
is required to attend The Basic School (TBS) for a period of six months. At the end of 
their training at TBS, all lieutenants are ranked according to their overall average in 
military skills, academics, and leadership. TBS policy states that one-third of the quota 
for each MOS comes from the top, middle, and bottom thirds of the performance list. 
Within each third, class standing is the primary assignment criterion. Lieutenants near the 
top of their one-third have the best opportunity to receive one of their top MOS choices. 
Lieutenants near the bottom of their one-third increment have a smaller chance. This 
policy ensures that each MOS receives an appropriate share of the higher performing and 
lower performing lieutenants. 
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H. MODEL 2 (FIRST OR SECOND CHOICE CORPS GUARANTEE) 
The second optimization model that was developed utilized the number of 
positions that were available and ensured each cadet received an allocation that was 
either their first or second corps preference. The inputs to the model were decision 
variables, constraints, and objective function. 
The decision variables were a function of the number of cadets that needed to be 
allocated to a corps multiplied by the number of different corps available. For the 2008 
model, there were 12 possible corps and 94 cadets who required an allocation. The 
number of decision variables is a function of these two figures; therefore, there were 
1,128 decision variables for the 2008 model. For the 2009 model, there were 13 possible 
corps and 82 cadets, yielding 1,066 decision variables. 
There were four constraints for this model. The first was that the sum of all the 
cadets achieving their first or second preference had to equal the total number of cadets 
who required a corps allocation. Secondly, the value of each decision variable had to be a 
whole number (integer). This means that every value allocated to the decision variable 
matrix had to be a whole number; no cell or value could be a fraction. Thirdly, the value 
of the decision variable had to be non-negative. Non-negativity ensured that a large 
positive value was not offset by a correspondingly large negative value.  Fourthly, each 
cadet had to be allocated to a corps. This is evident in the decision variable matrix, 
because each row is required to have a total value equal to one: having a value of one for 
each row means that each cadet is allocated to one and only one corps.   
The objective function for this model was to minimize the difference between the 
positions available in each corps and the actual number of cadets allocated to each corps, 
because it was not possible to assign all cadets to one of their top two choices and meet 
the corps’ end-strength targets.  Solver sought to minimize the objective function by 
allocating every cadet to either their first or second corps preference, while also 
minimizing the gap between the number of planned positions available for each corps and 
the actual allocation to each corps.   
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When solver was run for Model 2 (2008), the result was an over-allocation in two 
corps and a slight under-allocation in three corps. It is possible to ensure every cadet 
achieves their first or second corps preference with minimal alteration to the planned 
corps allocation numbers. A full list of the corps overages and underages is contained in 
Table 23. 
Table 23.   Model 2 Corps Breakdown (2008) 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M 
Planned 3 n/a 8 10 8 2 10 4 10 8 6 15 10
Actual 3 n/a 8 9 8 5 8 4 10 8 4 17 10
Difference 
(number) 
0 n/a4 0 -1 0 +3 -2 0 0 0 -2 +2 0 
 
For the 2008 data, Model 2 spreads cadets fairly evenly across their first or 
second preference. A complete breakdown of the preference achievement is contained in 
Table 24. 
Table 24.   Model 2 Preference Achievement (2008)  
Summary Number Percentage 
First preferences 55 58.51% 
Second preferences 39 41.49% 
 94 100.00% 
 
                                                 
4 Corps B was not available in 2008. 
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When solver was run for Model 2 (2009), the result included no over- or under-
allocation. It is possible to provide every cadet their first or second corps preference with 
absolutely no alteration to the planned corps allocation numbers. A full list of the corps 
overage and underage is contained in Table 25. 
Table 25.   2009 Corps Breakdown (Model 2) 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Planned 7 2 7 7 6 2 7 3 5 6 8 13 
9 




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
For the 2009 data, Model 2 spreads cadets fairly evenly across their first and 
second preferences. A complete breakdown of the preference achievement is contained in 
Table 26. 
Table 26.   2009 Preference Achievement (Model 2) 
Summary Number Percentage 
First preferences 43 52.44% 
Second preferences 39 47.56% 
 82 100.00% 
 
The next step was to amend the planned or desired 2009 corps allocation to reflect 
the overages and underages that resulted from the previous year’s allocation. The 
overages and underages contained in Table 23 were incorporated into the new corps 
allocation numbers for 2009.  This adjusted each of the 2009 corps allocation numbers by 
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the exact amount in which they differed in 2008. For example, the results from Model 2 
(2008) had an underage of one in corps D, increasing the desired corps allocation for 
corps D by one in 2009. The revised corps allocation is contained in Table 27. 
Table 27.   2009 Revised Corps Allocation Numbers (Model 2) 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M
2009 
(original) 
7 2 7 7 6 2 7 3 5 6 8 13 9 
2008 
(over / 
0 n/a 0 -1 0 +3 -2 0 0 0 -2 +2 0 
2009 
(revised) 
7 2 7 8 6 0 9 3 5 6 10 10 9 
 
When solver was run with the revised 2009 corps allocation numbers, the result 
was a negligible underage in two corps and a negligible overage in two corps. It is 
possible to ensure every cadet achieves their first or second corps preference with 
minimal alteration to the planned corps allocation numbers. When the 2008 overages and 
underages were factored into the 2009 data, the result was an overage of one in corps C 
and corps F and an underage of one in corps G and corps L. This is an impressive result, 
considering that during the period 2008–2009 there were a total of 176 allocations. Model 
2 ensured that every cadet from both 2008 and 2009 was allocated to either their first or 
second corps preference, with only two overages and two underages.  A full list of the 
corps overage and underage is contained in Table 28. 
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Table 28.   2009 Revised Corps Allocation Overage and Underage (Model 2)  
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M 
2009 
(original) 
7 2 7 7 6 2 7 3 5 6 8 13 9 
2009 
(revised) 
7 2 7 8 6 -1 9 3 5 6 10 105 9 
2009 
(actual) 
7 2 8 8 6 0 8 3 5 6 10 10 9 
2009 revised 
(over/under)  
0 0 +1 0 0 +1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 
2008 / 2009 
revised 
(over/under) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
For the revised 2009 allocation data, Model 2 produced an even spread of cadets 
achieving their first or second preference. A complete breakdown of the preference 
achievement is contained in Table 29. 
                                                 
5 The overage in Corps F was three in the 2008 allocation and the 2009 original allocation was only 
two. In order to maintain the same size graduating class, the Corps allocation for Corps L was reduced by 
one. 
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Table 29.   2009 Preference Achievement (Model 2 Revision) 
Summary Number Percentage 
First preferences 50 60.98% 
Second preferences 32 39.02% 
 82 100.00% 
 
The results from incorporating the 2008 overages and underages into the figures 
for 2009 and running solver indicates that it is possible to make up discrepancies from 
one year to the next.   
The best measure of the effectiveness of any model is to compare the new results 
to the benchmark results. A comparison of the benchmark data and the results from 
Model 2 are shown in Table 30. The table shows that the optimization model produces 
significant decrease in the number of cadets receiving their first, third, fourth and no 
preference and a significant increase in the percentage of cadets receiving their second 
preferences.  
Table 30.   Model 2 Preference Achievement (2008 and 2009 Combined)  
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 
(number) 
126 30 9 5 6 
Actual 
(percentage) 
71.59% 17.05% 5.11% 2.84% 3.41% 
Model 2 
(number) 
105 71 0 0 0 
Model 1 
(percentage) 
59.66% 40.34% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Difference 
(number) 
-21 +41 -9 -5 -6 
Difference 
(percentage) 
-11.93% +23.30% -5.11% -2.84% -3.41% 
 
The performance of Model 2 in relation to the three performance criteria is shown 
in Table 31. 
Table 31.   Model 2 Performance 
Criteria Grade 
Performance recognition Low 
Maximizing first preferences Low 
Minimizing third, fourth and no preference High 
Overall performance Low 
 
I. MODEL 3 (ALLOCATED BY QUEENS MEDAL ORDER) 
The third optimizing model that was developed utilized the number of positions 
that were available and ensured cadets with higher Queens medal scores were allocated to 
a high corps preference. The inputs to the model were decision variables, constraints, and 
objective function. 
The decision variables were a function of the number of cadets that needed to be 
allocated to a corps multiplied by the number of different corps available. For the 2008 
model, there were 12 possible corps available and 94 cadets who required an allocation. 
The number of decision variables is a function of these two figures: therefore, for the 
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2008 model, there were 1,128 decision variables. For the 2009 model, there were 13 
possible corps and 82 cadets; therefore, there were 1,066 decision variables. 
There were four constraints for this model. The first was that the value of each 
decision variable had to be a whole number (integer). This means that every value 
allocated to the decision variable matrix had to be a whole number, no cell or value could 
be a fraction. Secondly, the value of the decision variable had to be non-negative. Non-
negativity ensured that a large positive value was not offset by a correspondingly large 
negative value.  Thirdly, each cadet had to be allocated to a corps. This is evident in the 
decision variable matrix, because each row was required to have a total value equal to  
one, having a value of one for each row means that each cadet is allocated to one and 
only one corps.  Fourthly, the sum of all the allocations had to equal the sum of the 
available corps positions. 
All of the cadets were allocated to either the first, second, third, or fourth 
percentile, depending on their Queens medal score. The top 25% of cadets were allocated 
to the first quartile, the cadets who scored in the range of 25%–50% were allocated to the 
second quartile, the cadets who scored in the range of 50%–75% were allocated in the 
third quartile and the remaining cadets were placed in the fourth quartile. A penalty 
column was defined within Excel that assessed a penalty every time a cadet was allocated 
a preference that was higher than the quartile in which their Queens medal score had 
placed them. For example, if a cadet was 9th on the Queens medal list and, thus, was 
within the first quartile, a penalty would be assessed if solver allocated them to a corps 
that was not the cadet’s first preference. If a cadet was 50th on the Queens medal list and, 
thus, was within the third quartile, a penalty would be assessed if solver allocated them to 
a corps that was not in the cadet’s first three choices. The purpose of defining the model 
this way is to reward those with a better Queens medal scores. 
The objective function for this model was to minimize the sum of all the 
penalties. Solver sought to find corps allocations that minimized the gap between quartile 
grading and corps allocation.  
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When solver was run for Model 3 (2008), the result was that the majority of 
cadets received their first or second preference. The preference achievements for the 
original 2008 allocation and the proposed Model 3 allocation are compared in Table 32. 
Table 32.   2008 Preference Achievement (Original Allocation and Model 3) 
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 2008 
(number) 
64 15 6 5 4 
Actual 2008 
(percentage) 
68.09% 15.96% 6.38% 5.32% 4.26% 
Model 3 2008 
(number) 
60 24 9 1 0 
Model 3 2008  
(percentage) 
63.83% 25.53% 9.57% 1.06% 0.00% 
Difference 
(number) 
-4 +9 +3 -4 -4 
Difference 
(percentage) 
-4.26% 9.57% -3.19 -4.26% -4.26% 
 
A very important element of this model is to analyze the average score of  
the cadets within each allocation quartile. A comparison of the preference achievements 
for the original 2008 allocation and the proposed Model 3 allocation is contained in  
Table 33.  
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Table 33.   2008 Queens Medal Average (Original Allocation and Model 3) 
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 2008 
(Avg Queen)  
41.31 64.80 69.17 55.00 41.25 
Model 3 2008 
(Avg Queen)  
37.03 63.63 71.67 77.00 0.00 
Difference  -4.28 -1.17 2.50 22.00 N/A 
 
Table 33 shows that for Model 3, the average Queens medal score for cadets 
slowly increases as you move from those cadets who were allocated to their first 
preference out to those who were allocated to their fourth preference. However, cadets 
who received their fourth or no preference in the original allocation actually had a similar 
or better Queens medal score than those who received their first and second preferences. 
In a system that is designed to reward cadets for performance at RMC, Model 3 clearly 
produces a better allocation pattern. 
The preference achievement for the original 2009 allocation and the proposed 
Model 3 allocation is compared in Table 34. The results show there were significant 
changes across all possible allocation outcomes. Table 34 shows that Model 3 produces a 
significant decrease in the number of cadets receiving their first preference and a 
significant increase in the number of cadets receiving their second, third, and fourth 
preferences. 
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Table 34.   2009 Preference Achievements (Original Allocation and Model 3) 
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 2009 
(number) 
62 15 3 0 2 
Actual 2009 
(percentage) 
75.61% 18.30% 3.66% 0.00% 2.44% 
Model 3 2009 
(number) 
34 24 17 7 0 
Model 3 2009  
(percentage) 
41.46% 29.27% 20.73% 8.54% 0.00% 
Difference 
(number) 
-28 +9 +14 +7 -2 
Difference 
(percentage) 
-34.14% +10.98% +17.07% +8.54% -2.44% 
 
As previously mentioned, an integral component of assessing the validity of this 
model is to compare the average score of the cadets within each allocation bracket. The 
preference achievements for the original 2009 allocation and the proposed Model 3 
allocation are compared in Table 35.  
Table 35.   2009 Queens Medal Average (Original Allocation and Model 3) 
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 2009 
(Avg Queen)  
37.82 54.67 63.67 N/A 77.50 
Model 3 2009 
(Avg Queen)  
21.85 53.71 57.35 72.00 N/A 
Difference  -15.97 -0.96 -6.32 N/A N/A 
 68
Table 35 shows that for both Model 3 and the original allocation the average 
Queens medal score increases as you move from those cadets who were allocated to their 
first preference out to those who were allocated to their fourth preference. The model 
allocation is successful in maintaining a lower average Queens medal score for cadets 
being assigned to their first and second preference. This shows that the Model 3 
allocations pattern is providing a greater reward for Queens medal performance than the 
original allocation. In a system that is designed to reward cadets for performance at 
RMC, Model 3 produces a better allocation pattern for the 2009 data. 
The best measure of the effectiveness of any model is to compare the new results 
to the benchmark data. The results in Table 36, Table 37 and Table 38 show that Model 3 
provides mixed results. Table 36 shows that Model 3 produces a significant decrease in 
the number of cadets receiving their first preference and a significant increase in the 
number of cadets receiving their second or third preferences.  
Table 36.   Model 3 Preference Achievement  (2008 and 2009 Combined)  
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 
(number) 
126 30 9 5 6 
Actual 
(percentage) 
71.59% 17.05% 5.11% 2.84% 3.41% 
Model 3 
(number) 
94 48 26 8 0 
Model 3 
(percentage) 
53.41% 27.27% 14.77% 4.55% 0.00% 
Difference 
(number) 
-32 +18 +17 +3 -6 
Difference 
(percentage) 
-18.18% +10.22% +9.66% +1.70% -3.41% 
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Table 37 and Figure 2 show that Model 3 produces the ideal Queens medal 
spread. The cadets who were allocated to their first preference had the best average 
Queens medal score and the average Queens medal score slowly increases as you travel 
along the preference continuum. In the original allocation, cadets who were allocated to 
their fourth or no preference had a better average Queens medal score than those who 
received their second preference. 
Table 37.   2008 and 2009 Queens Medal Average (Original Allocation and Model 3) 
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 2008 
and 2009 Avg 
39.57 59.74 66.42 55.00 59.36 
Model 3 2008 
and 2009 Avg 
43.56 46.53 57.68 84.00 n/a 
Difference  +3.99 -13.21 -8.74 +29.00 n/a 
 


























Figure 2.   2008 and 2009 Queens Medal Average (Original Allocation and Model 3) 
Model 3 was not designed to maximize the number of cadets who were allocated 
to their first and second preferences, so it not as successful in achieving this objective, 
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but it is more successful in rewarding Queens medal performance, as is its intent. Table 
38 shows the performance of Model 3 in relation to the three stated criteria. 
Table 38.   Model 3 Performance 
Criteria Grade 
Performance recognition High 
Maximizing first preferences Low 
Minimizing third, fourth and no preference Medium 
Overall performance Medium 
 
It is important to note that there are potential flaws and biases in using Queens 
medal performance as the sole basis for corps allocation. A potential weakness for 
allocating cadets purely on this basis is the very nature of training at RMC. RMC’s 
assessment focuses on preparing cadets to assume the role of infantry platoon 
commanders. Those with a higher aptitude and motivation to serve within an Arms Corps 
will tend to receive higher scores; therefore, they will be more likely to obtain one of 
their top preferences. 
J. MODEL 4 (WEIGHTED FOR CADET PREFERENCE AND QUEENS 
MEDAL SCORE) 
RMC currently places significant weight on Queens medal performance during 
the corps allocation process. Those cadets with a strong Queens medal score are more 
likely to obtain a higher order corps preference than those cadets who receive a poor 
Queens medal score. Model 4 has been designed to weight both cadets’ preferences and 
their Queens medal score within the optimization process.  
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Model 4 utilized the number of positions that were available and ensured cadets 
with higher Queens medal scores were allocated to a higher corps preference. The inputs 
to the model were decision variables, constraints, and objective function. 
The decision variables were a function of the number of cadets that needed to be 
allocated to a corps multiplied by the number of different corps that where available. For 
the 2008 model, there were 12 possible corps available and 94 cadets that required an 
allocation. The number of decision variables is a function of these two figures; therefore, 
there were 1,128 decision variables. For the 2009 model, there were 13 possible corps 
and 82 cadets, creating 1,066 decision variables. 
There were four constraints for this model. The first was that the value of each 
decision variable had to be a whole number (integer). Every value in the decision variable 
matrix had to be a whole number: no cell or value could be a fraction. Secondly, the 
value of the decision variable had to be non-negative. Non-negativity ensured that a large 
positive value was not offset by a correspondingly large negative value.  Thirdly, each 
cadet had to be allocated to a corps. This is evident in the decision variable matrix 
because each row was required to have a total value equal to one, requiring a value of one 
for each row means that each cadet is only allocated to one corps.  Fourthly, the sum of 
all the allocations had to equal the sum of the available corps positions. 
As in Model 3, all of the cadets were allocated to either the first, second, third or 
fourth percentile, depending on their Queens medal score. The top 25% of cadets were 
allocated to the first quartile: the cadets who scored in the range of 25%–50% range were 
allocated to the second quartile: the cadets who scored in the range of 50%–75% range 
were allocated to the third quartile: and the remaining cadets were placed in the fourth 
quartile. A reward column was defined within Excel that assessed a premium every time 
a cadet was allocated a preference that was equal to or higher than the quartile for their 
Queens medal score. For example, if a cadet was ninth on the Queens medal list, they 
were within the first quartile; the model assesses a premium if that cadet is allocated to 
their first corps preference. Allocating an individual who was in the top 25% of their 
class to any preference other than their first preference would result in a smaller 
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premium. Cadets scoring in the 50–75% range in the Queens medal list would be in the 
third quartile; a lower premium is assessed if solver allocated them to a corps preference 
that is not in their first three choices. This model rewards those with a higher Queens 
medal score. 
The objective function for this model was to maximize the sum of the Queens 
medal cell and the preference weighting cell. This equation can be expressed as: A1 = B1 
+ B2. 
A1 = objective function,  
B1 = sum of the Queens medal cell, and  
B2 = sum of the preference weighting cell. 
The formula for the Queens medal cell was defined so that every cadet who 
received a preference allocation that was equal to or less than their quartile allocation was 
assigned a value of ten. Cadets who received a preference allocation that was higher than 
their quartile allocation were assigned a value five minus their quartile allocation. By 
setting the formula up in this manner, solver sought to maximize the sum of all these cells 
by maximizing the number of cadets who received an allocation that was equal to or 
lower than the quarter in which their Queens medal score had allocated them. A 
representation of how this was defined within Excel is shown in Table 39.  
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Table 39.   Queens Medal Cell (B1) 
Cadet Quartile Preference Reward 
1 2 1 10 
2 2 3 36 
…………….    
95 4 3 10 
   B17  
The weighted cell was the sum product of the five possible preference allocations 
and the five weightings. The sum of the “number of cadets” equals the total number of 
cadets needing an allocation, and the sum product cell is the result of the “number of 
cadets” row multiplied by the “weighting” row. A representation of how this was defined 
within Excel is shown in Table 40. 
Table 40.   Preference Weighting Cell (B2) 
 
 




66 23 5 0 0 
Weighting 
 
30 20 10 1 -20 
Sum 
product 
B28      
                                                 
6 If preference achievement is less than quartile allocation than the following formula was applied. 
Reward = five – quartile allocation (5 – 2 = 3). 
7 B1 = sum of above cells 




When solver was run for Model 4 (2008), the result was an increase in the number 
of cadets receiving both their first and second preferences and there was a drop in the 
number of cadets receiving their third, fourth, or no preference. For 2008, model 4 
ensured 70% of cadets received their first choice corps, compared to 68% in the actual 
allocation: only 5% of cadets would have received their third, fourth or no preference, 
compared to 16% in the actual allocation. The actual 2008 preference achievement and 
the Model 4 (2008) allocation are compared in Table 41. 
Table 41.   2008 Preference Achievement (Original Allocation and Model 4) 
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 2008 
(number) 
64 15 6 5 4 
Actual 2008 
(percentage) 
68.09% 15.96% 6.38% 5.32% 4.26% 
Model 4 2008 
(number) 
66 23 5 0 0 
Model 4 2008  
(percentage) 70.22% 24.49% 5.32% 0.00% 0.00% 
Difference 
(number) +2 +8 -1 -5 -4 
Difference 
(percentage) +2.13% +8.51% -1.06% -5.32% -4.26% 
 
The purpose of Model 4 is to not only to maximize higher order preferences but it 
also seeks to reward cadets with higher Queens medal ranking. Therefore, it is important  
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to analyze the average score of the cadets within each allocation bracket. A comparison 
of the preference achievements for the original 2008 allocation and the Model 4 
allocation is contained in Table 42.  
Table 42.   2008 Queens Medal Average (Original Allocation and Model 4) 
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 2008 
Avg Queen  
41.31 64.80 69.17 55.00 41.25 
Model 4 2008 
Avg Queen  
44.83 49.74 73.60 N/A N/A 
Difference  +3.52 -15.06 +4.43 N/A N/A 
 
Table 41 shows that for Model 4, the average 2008 Queens medal score for cadets 
slowly increases as you move from those cadets who were allocated to their first 
preference out to those who were allocated to their third preference. However, cadets 
who received their fourth or no preference in the original allocation actually had a similar 
or better Queens medal score than those who received their first preference and second 
preferences. In a system that is designed to reward cadets for performance at RMC, 
Model 4 clearly produces a better allocation pattern. 
When solver was run for Model 4 (2009), the number of cadets receiving their 
first or second preferences was the same as the original allocation: the number receiving 
their third and fourth preference each increased by one in Model 4, and no cadets were 
allocated to a corps that was not contained in their four preferences. The actual 2009 
preference achievement and the proposed Model 4 (2009) allocation are compared in 
Table 43. 
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Table 43.   2009 Preference Achievement  (Original Allocation and Model 4) 
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 2009 
(number) 
62 15 3 0 2 
Actual 2009 
(percentage) 
75.61% 18.30% 3.66% 0.00% 2.44% 
Model 4 2009 
(number) 
62 15 4 1 0 
Model 4 2009 
(percentage) 
75.61% 18.30% 4.88% 1.22% 0.00% 
Difference 
(number) 
0 0 +1 +1 -2 
Difference 
(percentage) 
0.00% 0.00% +1.22% +1.22% -2.44% 
 
As previously mentioned, it is also important to assess the average Queens medal 
score of each allocation group. The preference achievements for the original 2009 
allocation and the proposed Model 4 allocation are compared in Table 44. The table 
shows that both the Model 4 allocation and the actual allocation are successful in 
ensuring a relatively consistent rise in the average Queens medal score as you move from 
first preference out to those individuals who received their fourth or no preference. 
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Table 44.   2009 Queens Medal Average (Original Allocation and Model 4) 
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 2009 
Avg Queen  
37.82 54.67 63.67 N/A 77.50 
Model 4 2009 
Avg Queen  
42.34 43.31 41.75 84.00 n/a 
Difference  +4.52 -11.36 -21.92 n/a n/a 
 
The best measure of the effectiveness of any model is to compare the new results 
to the initial results. A comparison of the benchmark data and the results from Model 4 
results are summarized in Tables 45 and 46, and Figure 3. Table 45 shows that the 
optimization model significantly increases the percentage of cadets receiving their first or 
second preferences and reduces the percentage of cadets receiving their third, fourth, or 
no preference.  
Table 45.   Model 4 Preference Achievement (2008 and 2009 Combined)  
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 
(number) 
126 30 9 5 6 
Actual 
(percentage) 
71.59% 17.05% 5.11% 2.84% 3.41% 
Model 4 
(number) 
128 38 9 1 0 
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 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Model 4 
(percentage) 
72.73% 21.59% 5.11% 0.57% 0.00% 
Difference 
(number) 
+2 +8 0 -4 -6 
Difference 
(percentage) 
+1.14% +4.54% 0.00% -2.27% -3.14% 
 
Table 46 and Figure 3 show that Model 4 produces the ideal linear relationship 
between preference achievement and Queens medal score. The average Queens medal 
score increases as you move from the cadets who received their first preference out to 
those who received their fourth preference. 
Table 46.   2008 and 2009 Queens Medal Average (Original Allocation and Model 4)  
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual (2008 / 
2009 Avg 
Queen)  
39.57 59.74 66.42 55.00 59.36 
Model 4 (2008 / 
2009 Avg 
Queen)  
43.59 46.53 57.68 84.00 n/a 





Figure 3.   2008 and 2009 Queens Medal Average (Original Allocation and Model 4) 
Model 4 provides distinct benefits for corps allocation over the current allocation. 
The model significantly increases the number of cadets who receive higher order 
preferences whilst reducing the number of cadets who receive unfavorable preferences. 
Table 47 shows the performance of Model 4 in relation to the three stated performance 
criteria. 
Table 47.   Model 4 Performance 
Criteria Grade 
Performance recognition High 
Maximizing first preferences High 
Minimizing third, fourth and no preference High 
Overall performance High 
 


























Table 48 shows that the percentages for first second, third, fourth and no 
preference varies significantly between the original allocation and each of the four 
models that were developed.  
Table 48.   Preference Achievement Percentages (Original and Models) 




71.59% 17.05% 5.11% 2.84% 3.41% 
Model 1 
(percentage) 
76.14% 19.89% 2.27% 1.70% 0.00% 
Model 2 
(percentage) 
55.68% 44.32% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Model 3 
(percentage) 
53.41% 27.27% 14.77% 4.55% 0.00% 
Model 4 
(percentage) 
72.73% 21.59% 5.11% 0.57% 0.00% 
K. MODEL SUMMARY  
Table 49 shows the performance of each of the four models in relation to the three 
performance criteria that were selected. The table shows that the first three optimization 
models have areas in which they are strong and some areas in which they are weaker. 
Model 4, however, is strong in all three performance categories.   
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Table 49.   Model Performance Summary 
Criteria Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Performance recognition Low Low High High 
Maximizing first preferences High Low Low High 
Minimize third, fourth, no preference High High Medium High 
Overall performance Medium Low Medium High 
 
The model that is recommended as the strongest and most effective is Model 4. 
This model significantly increases the number of cadets who receive higher order 
preferences, whilst reducing the number of cadets who receive unfavorable preferences. 
The model is also successful in ensuring better performing cadets have a greater chance 
of securing a higher order preference. The model provides a balance between rewarding 
achievement, meeting stated manning outcomes, and maximizing organizational and 
individual goals. Model 4 provides distinct benefits for RMC corps allocation. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this research was to determine whether corps allocation is a 
significant factor affecting retention, and whether there were alternatives to the current 
corps allocation process of Australian Army officers. Ascertaining whether there is any 
correlation between corps allocation and retention required capturing a large amount of 
data. Unfortunately, the Australian Army does not maintain suitable data on officer 
retention that can be matched to corps preference and corps allocation. The USMC does 
maintain such data and, therefore, this data was analyzed to assess whether there is a 
relationship between corps allocation and retention. The USMC training dynamic and 
corps allocation process are extremely similar to the Australian Army. It is possible to 
relate the conclusions that are drawn about the USMC to the Australian Army because of 
the similarities between the two armed forces and the two countries.   
The USMC data was refined to allow for regression analysis. The regression 
model that was developed was a simple linear probability model (a multiple linear 
regression model with a binary dependant variable). The model that was developed can 
be expressed in the following manner: 
Retained 6 years = β1*MOS first Preference Achievement + β2*MOS 
second Preference Achievement + β3*MOS Preference Achievement not 
in top 3 + β4*White + β5*Black + β6*Hispanic + β7*Married + 
β8*Number of Dependents + β9*Prior Enlisted + β7*Education (civilian 
masters) + β8*FY dummy variables + u 
The results from the regression showed that remaining in the military beyond a 
minimum service obligation was positively affected by: receiving your first Military 
Occupational Specialties (MOS) preference, prior service, being a male, being married, 
and having a Master’s degree. Remaining in the military beyond an Minimum Service 
Obligation (MSO) was negatively affected by: receiving an MOS outside your top three 
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preferences, being Hispanic, and having a higher number of dependents. The results from 
the six-year regression model verified that allocating cadets to an MOS of their choice is 
a very important element within the retention framework of military officers. 
The cost of training each Royal Military College (RMC) cadet to become an 
officer in the Australian Army is extremely high. It is imperative to make every effort to 
provide each cadet with a rewarding career in their chosen field. The first step in this 
process is achieving a corps allocation that maximizes the cadets’ preferences whilst also 
meeting the Army’s requirements. The optimization models that were developed in 
Chapter IV will help reduce the workload on RMC staff and also ensure the best possible 
outcome for both RMC cadets and the Australian Army.   
Optimization models were developed that maximized cadet preferences whilst 
also meeting service requirements. Data from cadets who graduated from RMC in 2008 
and 2009 was utilized to develop more robust and effective allocation models. The 
models showed significant increases in those cadets who received their first or second 
preference and significant decreases in cadets being allocated to the third, fourth, or other 
preferences. 
The first optimizing model that was developed sought to emphasize allocating 
each cadet to one of their highest preferences by maximizing the weighted average score 
of allocations. The weightings assigned were 25, 15, 5, 1, and -20 for an allocation to the 
first, second, third, fourth and other preference, respectively. Compared to the original 
data, Model 1 significantly increased the number of cadets who received higher order 
preferences whilst reducing the number of cadets who received unfavorable preferences. 
The problem with Model 1 is that it does not consider a cadet’s performance or Queens 
medal score in the allocation. Recognition and reward of performance is seen as a key 
element of Australian Army officer training. It is important to note that many countries 
throughout the world have intentionally removed training performance from the corps 
allocation process. The benefit of excluding performance as a driver for the allocation 
process is that it aids in the even distribution of talent throughout each of the separate  
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corps. The militaries of countries such as the United States have developed policies that 
ensure each of their corps is allocated an appropriate mix of both higher performing and 
lower performing officers.  
The second optimization model ensured each cadet received an allocation that 
was either their first or second corps preferences. This model was developed to address 
the regression results that were obtained in Chapter III: a linear probability model that 
utilized USMC data. The results showed that remaining in the military beyond a 
minimum service obligation was positively affected by receiving your first MOS 
preference. 
Model 2 showed that it was possible to ensure every cadet achieves their first or 
second corps preference with minimal alteration to the planned corps allocation numbers. 
Furthermore, the model showed that a corps overage or underage from one year could be 
resolved in the following year. When Model 2 was run for the actual RMC data from 
2008 and 2009, the result after the 2009 allocation was an overage of one in corps C and 
corps F and an underage of one in corps G and corps L. This is an impressive result 
considering that over the period 2008–2009 there were a total of 176 allocations. Model 2 
allocated every cadet from both 2008 and 2009 to either their first or second corps 
preference, with only two overages and two underages.   
The third optimization model ensured cadets with higher Queens medal scores 
were allocated to a high corps preference. The results in Tables 33 and 34 show that 
Model 3 provided mixed results. The tables show that Model 3 produced a significant 
decrease in the number of cadets receiving their first preference and a significant increase 
in the number of cadets receiving their second or third preferences. Table 34 shows that 
Model 3 produces a more effective Queens medal spread. The cadets who were allocated 
to their first preference had the best average Queens medal score; the average Queens 
medal score slowly increases as you travel along the preference continuum. Model 3 is 
not as successful in its spread of preference achievement but it is successful in rewarding 
performance (Queens medal score).  
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Model 4 was the final model that was developed, and it weighted both the cadet’s 
preferences and their Queens medal score within the optimization process. This model 
significantly increases the number of cadets who receive higher order preferences whilst 
reducing the number of cadets who receive unfavorable preferences. Model 4 produced a 
strong linear relationship between preference achievement and Queens medal score. The 
average Queens medal score slowly increases as you move from the cadets who received 
their first preference out to those who received their fourth preference.  Model 4 provides 
distinct benefits for the RMC corps allocation. The model provides a balance between 
rewarding achievement, meeting stated manning outcomes, and maximizing 
organizational and individual goals. 
Table 50 provides a summary of the preference achievements for the actual 
allocation and for each of the four models that were developed. 
Table 50.   Preference Achievement Percentages (Original and Models)  
 First Pref Second Pref Third Pref Fourth Pref No Pref 
Actual 
(percentage) 
71.59% 17.05% 5.11% 2.84% 3.41% 
Model 1 
(percentage) 
76.14% 19.89% 2.27% 1.70% 0.00% 
Model 2 
(percentage) 
55.68% 44.32% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Model 3 
(percentage) 
53.41% 27.27% 14.77% 4.55% 0.00% 
Model 4 
(percentage) 
72.73% 21.59% 5.11% 0.57% 0.00% 
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B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research has proven there is a definite link between corps allocation and 
retention dynamics. The Australian Army should incorporate optimization modeling into 
the corps allocation process; the model that is recommended is Model 4. The basis of 
Model 4 was that it sought to maximize higher order cadet preferences whilst adhering to 
the number of positions available within each corps. When Model 4 was run with the 
actual data from 2008 and 2009, it offered a significant increase in the percentage of 
cadets receiving their first or second preferences and a significant reduction in the 
percentage of cadets receiving their third, fourth, or no preference. It also was sensitive to 
the Queens medal ranking, emphasizing preferences for those with better Queens medal 
scores. By significantly increasing the number of cadets who receive higher order 
preferences whilst reducing the number of cadets who receive unfavorable preferences, 
the model improves the potential for retention beyond an officer’s minimum return of 
service obligation.   
1.  Primary Research Question  
The primary research question that this thesis sought to answer was, does a 
cadet’s allocation to either their first, second, third, or fourth corps preference affect their 
propensity to discharge? The literature research and regression analysis prove that there is 
a strong link between preference achievement and retention dynamics. Cadets who 
receive their first preference are far more likely to remain after their MSO than those 
cadets who receive their third, fourth or none of their preferences.   
2.  Secondary Research Questions  
The secondary research question was whether there are alternatives to the current 
corps allocation process in the Australian Army? The four models that were developed in 
Chapter IV show that there are alternatives to the current corps allocation process. The 
model were able to place emphasis on either Queens medal score, maximizing higher 
order preferences, minimizing lower order preferences or completely eliminating lower 
order preferences. The models provide an efficient and effective tool that staff at the 
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Royal military College (RMC) can use to help guide the corps allocation of cadets. The 
models are not intended to replace staff input into the corps allocation process; rather 
they are intended to relieve some of the workload.  
C. RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Further experiments could strengthen and confirm the model results that were 
achieved in Chapter IV. The Australian Army should look to use the Monte Carlo method 
to assess the effectiveness of the optimization Model 4. A Monte Carlo method is a 
technique that involves using random numbers to solve problems. Monte Carlo methods 
are often used in simulating mathematical problems. Monte Carlo methods are very 
useful because of their reliance on repeated computations of random or pseudo-random 
numbers. Using Monte Carlo would enable random cadet corps preferences to be 
generated. These preferences could then be inputted into Model 4 to access the preference 
achievement of the model. Not relying solely on actual data and instead using the new 
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